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PART A
COMMUNITY.WIDE TRENDS
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Section 1: The Community economy in 1993
1.1 Main economic trends
ln 1993, the period of slow growth or near stagnation, which had started in 1991'
turned into an outright recession. Last year, Community output declined by about a
quarter of a percentage point in real terms; only the second time in the 35 year history
of the European Community that a real decline in GDP was registered. In 1975, in
the wake of the first oil shock, the GDP drop had been stronger (almost one per cent),
but - in a more pronounced cyclical pattern - the contraction had been preceded and
followed by periods of strong growth. The current period of economic difficulties
follows a long period of steady and satisfactory growth, but, if the forecasts for 1994
prove correct, the overall loss of output could be larger than that experienced during
the 1974-75 and 1980-83 episodes. Employment fell by a record amount - 2.4 million
jobs lost in the course of the year - and unemployment increased at a fast pace
reaching a level of 10.6 per cent of the civilian labour force.
Chart 1
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The recession had also a strong ef|ect on the COmmunity's convergence performance'
Real convergence stalled and nominal convergence presented a mixed result:
inflationary pressures abated but budgetary positions deteriorated substantially.
1.1.1. Growth performance of the Community and its main trading
partners
1993 was a ye&r of recession..
After a period of strong groMh leading to a clear-cut case of overheating in the
second half of the 1980s, the Community's economy lost steam in the course of 1990'
Under the impact of the policy tightening, essentially through monetary policy, which
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had taken place in the Community following the appearance of the first serious
macroeconomic imbalances and under the impact of the recession which hit the United
States in l99l and other important industrialised countries, the Community's rate of
growrh fell substantially below potential from the end of 1990 to the first half of 19192'
The decline would have certainly been more pronounced had it not been for strong
growth in Germany. In the second half of 1992, however, the combination ol'an
absence of signs of recovery, rising unemployment, continued tight economic policies,
exchange rate instability and negative political factors provoked a marked
deterioration in the expectations of economic agents and turned the period of slow
growth into stagnation and, from the beginning of 1993, recession.
Table 1: The community economy : use and supply of goods and
services and main economic indicators
... but the econonry may have reached the trough
However, there are now some encouraging signs which suggest that the decline in
activity may have levelled offsince the summer of 1993. The latest survey results also
indicate that the Community economy may have reached the trough of the curr'ent
recession. In the last few months, the main economic sentiment indicators have
moved out of the low levels which had been reached and some of them, especially the
industrial and construction confidence indicators, are again on a slightly rising trend
(see chart l5). In summary, Community GDP increased by I'a per cent in 1991, by
1 . 1 per cent in 1992 and declined by 0.3 per cent in 1993.
(annual real percentage change) 1 988 1 989 1 990 1991 1992 1 993
Private consumPtion
Government consumPtion
Gross fixed capital formation
4.3
1.9
8.7
3.2
1.4
6.9
3.1
2.0
3.8
1.9
1.5
-0.3
1.8
2.0
0.0
-0.1
0.5
-1t.6
Domestic demand (incl. stocks)
Exoorts of ooods and services a)
5.1
2.5
3.7
5.0
2.9
5.7
1.1
6.6
1.4
3.4
-1.3
3.6
lmports of goods and services a1
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
10.5
4.2
7.2
3.5
4.3
3.0
2.5
1.4
4.6
1.1
-3r.1
- 0.3
Inflation (deflator private consu4Ption) 3.8 5.0 4.5 5.4 4.6 3i.8
Employment 1.5 1.5 1.7 0.2 -1.2 -1.7
Unemolovment {% of active pop.) 9.8 8.9 8.3 8.7 9.7 10.9
Public deficits (% or cDP) b) -3.4 -2.7 -4.0 -4.6 - 5.0 - 6.0
Current account bal. tx of GDP) 0.1 -0.2 -0.4 -1.2 -1 .1 -0.6
;ccount balance include the five new German Lander from 'lll91
onwards. 
- 
The figures for GDP and its components, inflation and employmenvunemployment include the new Ldnder
from 1992 onwards.
a\ Extra-Communitv trade onlv b) General government net borrowing
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Cyctical downturn in majority of Member countries
Notwithstanding the strength of the recessionary forces in 1992, a decline of output
was registered only in the United Kingdom, where the economy had already entered
into a recession in 1990-91. In 1993, however, most Member countries registered a
stagnating or falling GDP with the exception of the United Kingdom, which started to
emerge from a very severe recession, plus Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.
The most marked declines occurred in the western part of Germany (- 1,9 per cent)
and in Belgium (-1,3 per cent). Tabte 2:
Substantial declines in output - about
one per cent - were registered also in
France and Spain, while in Greece, Italy
and Portugal the contraction was about
a quarter to a half a percentage point.
Positive rates of growth of about 2 per
cent were recorded in the United
Kingdom, where the recovery took hold
firmly, and in Ireland. The eastern parl
of Germany, sustained by large financing
flows coming from the rest of the
country, again registered a substantial
rate of growth (7.1 Per cent). As a
result, the recorded decline in German
GDP was reduced to -1.2 Per cent.
Economic qrowth in the
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
B
DK
WD
D
GR
E
F
IRL
I
L
NL
P
UK
5.0
1,2
3.7
4.1
5.2
4.5
4.2
4.1
5.7
2.6
3.9
5.0
3.6
0.6
;
4.7
4.3
6.2
2.9
6.7
4.7
5.2
2.2
3./.
2.0
5.7
"0.1
J.b
2.5
9.0
2.1
3.2
4.1
4.4
0.4
1.8
1.2
4.5
1.8
2.2
0.7
1.O
't?
?1
2.1
2.1
-t.5
1.4
1.2
1.6
2.1
1.3
0.8
1.4
4.8
na
1.9
1.4
1.1
{.5
' -1.3
0.0
'-1.9
'-1.2
-u.t
.U.Y
'4.7
2.0
-0.3
u.l
' 0.3
4.5
' 2.1
ECtrt
EC
4.2 ,j ?n 1.4 1.0
1.1
* 
-0.4
'-0.3
(1) Excluding the five new German Ldncler
European Commission estimates of November 1993 except for
the figures marked with an asterix where more recent
information has been included
Community output developments opposite to those of the rest of the lltorld
In 1993, the recession in the Community contrasted with an improving performance in
the world economy. After having practically stagnated in 1991, output in the rest of
the world picked up slowly and expanded in 1993 by 2.2 per cent. The differing
European and world performances are essentially due to the recovery in the USA and
to the substantial growth registered in the non-OECD countries, especially those of
south-east Asia and of Latin America. Japan and most of the other OECD countries,
on the other hand, registered unsatisfactory growth figures. The divergence in the
GDp performances is mirrored in the trade figures. The combined imports of the rest
of the world increased by more than 8 per cent in real terms, while EC imports from
the rest of the world declined by about 3 per cent.
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The recovery of the US economy, which had entered into recession before Europe and
Japan, was slower than in the past: a drop in GDP of just above one per cent in l99l
was followed in 1992 and 1993 by rates of growth of 26 and 3 per cent respectively'
The recovery of employment was also weaker, but in 1993 employment still expanded
by 1.5 per cent, a figure which compares favourably with the performance of many
other industrialised countries. The main factors supporting growth were historically
low interest rates, which supported the restoration of financial equilibrium in the
private sector, and a continued relatively weak US-dollar which led to a substantial
increase in exports. In addition, strong growth impulses came from the wide-ranging
structural adjustment efforts of the business sector, especially industry, which were
associated with high levels of investment'
"* 
t 
Gro*th ln the Industrlallsed countries :
EC and the resl of the OECO
The Japanese economY, oD the contrary,
is experiencing a period of very weak
growth. In 1993, output stagnated for
the first time since 1974. One important
factor behind the slowdown was the need
for firms and households to adjust their
spending behaviour following the large
variations in asset prices which had taken
place. As in Europe, there are as yet no clear signs of recovery' A small positive
contribution could come from the monetary and fiscal easing which has taken place,
but the appreciation of the yen will be an important negative force-
In Europe, the EFTA countries experienced their third consecutive year of output fall
in 1993 (-1.1 per cent). This was the result of both the weakness of the domestic
economy and of the decline in their European Community export markets. The
economies of Central and Eastern Europe continued to be affected by a number of
factors, including the adjustment plogrammes undertaken to move to a market
economy, the collapse of CMEA trade and a severe drought' After a lange
contraction - about 10 per cent in real terms - in 1991, output continued to decline in
most countries in both 1992 and 1993, though in all of them the decline was smaller in
1993 than in 1992. A positive rate of growth was registered, however, in Poland.
22{3-94
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1.1.2. Rec es s io n c ouses further fall in emp loy ment..
The 1992/93 recession has ted to a sharp fall in employment and a marked increase in
unemployment. This is due both to the severity of the decline in economic activity
and to the fact that employment trends have become more responsive to the economic
cycle (see chart 4). In the second half of the 1980s, satisfactory, but historically not
exceptional' rates of economic growth led to record rates of increase in employment
(between 1.2 and 7.7 per cent a year). In 1993, the recession resulted in a decline in
employment of almost 2 percent (-l.z per cent), another, unwelcome, record in the
Chart 3
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Community's economic history. Even excluding the eastern part of Germany, where
the employment losses are essentially due to the wide-ranging adjustment taking place,
the current recession has cost, until now, around three million jobs.
Taking into account the expected drop by a further half a point in the current year, the
employment loss incurred during the present period of economic difficulties is larger
than those of the two previous economic crises. The total contraction in employment
over the period 1992-1994 is likely to
reach 2.7 per cent excluding the
eastern part of Germany or 3.4 per
cent if this area is included. By
contrast, employment declined by 2.4
percent over the period 1981-1993
andbyonly l.l percentin 1975.
The greater cyclical responsiveness of
employment to economic trends.
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however, prevented a repeat of the strong deteriorations in investment
which were experienced during previous recessions which means that, all
being equal, the recovery could be faster and more durable'
Table 3
Given these emPloYment trends,
Notwithstanding a slowing down in
profitability
other things
unemployment continued to increase rapidly'
the average rate of increase in the labour force'
Unemployffiort rzr
of the civilian labour foroe
Employment 61
B
DK
D ('r)
0
GR
E
F
IRL.
I
L
NL
P
UK
1988 1989 19S0 1991 1992 1993
B
DK
D (1)
D
GR
E
F
IRL
I
L
NL
P
fi2 8.6 7.6 7.5 8,2 9.4
6.4 7.7 8.'1 8.9 9.5 10.4
6.3 5.6 4.8 4.2 4.5 5.6
-- 5.8 6.8 8.1
7.7 7.5 7.0 7.2 7.5 7.6
19.3 17.1 16.2 16.4 18.2 21.5
9.9 9.4 9.0 9.5 10.0 10.8
17.3 15J 14.5 16.2 17.8 18.4
10.9 10.9 10.0 10.1 10.3 11.2
2.0 1.8 1,7 1.6 1.9 2.6
9.3 8.4 7.5 7 .1 7 .2 8,8
5.7 5.0 4.6 4.0 3.9 5.0
8.5 7.1 7.0 8.9 10.2 10.5
'-1.4
-1.0
t11
-l.t
'-2.0
n
4.3
-1.4
.0.7
-1.5
1.1
{.8
-1.9
.1.3
-0.4
{.1
0.9
-1.7
2.1
-1 q
-0.5
'0.5
4,9
1,9
0.8
4.6
-2.2
0.1
{.9
2.6
4a
0.5
0
'0.3
0.8
4.3
1.5
nq
-3.1
1.4
{.5
3.0
1.2
3.2
1.0
'2.9
0.8
4.3
2.3
0.9
1.1
1.6
4.6
1.5
0.3
3.4
1.3
'0.9
0.1
3.7
1.9
1.0
2.5
1.5
-0.6
0.8
1.6
2.8
0.9
'0.0
0.9
3.1
1.6
0.1
3.2
9.8 8.9 8.3 8.7 9.4 10.5
-- 8.9 9.7 10.9
(t1 european Commission estimates of November 1993 except for the ligures marked with an asterix uhere more recent
infonnation has been included. (2) Harmonised Eurostat deftnitions (3) Excluding the five new German Linder
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unemployment in the European Community increased by 0.4 percentage points in
1991, by 0.7 points in 1992 and by more than a full point (l 1) in 1993.
The average rate of unemployment for the Community stood in 1993 at 10.6 per cent
and was therefore practically back to the previous record level reached in 1985. The
wide differences in the individual performances of the Member States persisted and
actually increased. In Spain unemployment rose to over 2l per cent and in Ireland to
over l8 per cent. In Germany the corresponding rate was less than 6 per cent for the
western part of the country and about eight per cent for the country as a whole.
1.1.3. Convergence situation in the Community
The current economic difiiculties have also had a profound effect on.
o real convergence, the long term process of narrowing the differences in standards
of living, and
a nominal convergence, the.improvement in the individual performances in terms
of inflation and public finance positions which is necessary for the transition to
Economic and Monetarv Union.
Real convergence: catching-up process stalled
Of the four poorest Community countries only Ireland was able to achieve a positive
growth rate of economic activity in 1993 and Table 4:
thus improve its relative position. In the g
other three countries output contracted: in
Greece slightly less than the Community
average, in Portugal close to, and in Spain
somewhat more than, the average. As a
result, no significant changes could be
registered for these countries in their relative
positions in terms of GDP per head (the
indicator usually used to approximate real
standards of living). Unemployment, on the
other hand, increased in all these countries
including Ireland (see table 3). The
deterioration in this respect was very strong
in Spain where unemployment increased by
more than 3 percentage points whereas in the
't07.0
104.9
'120.3
104.9
48.9
75.7
109.7
75.4
102.9
128.9
100.2
60.7
96.2
104.1
106.2
117.3
47.2
75.0
110.7
-t] .,
102.3
126.6
101 .9
55.9
101.4
't06.2
105.8
117.4
104.0
49.0
75.7
109.2
aat
't03.6
130.1
'100.2
61.1
98.9
1M.7
114.2
't18.9
51.3
70.5
112.0
64.8
102.6
120.3
104.4
51.4
100.9
B
DK
WD
D
GR
E
F
IRL
I
L
NL
P
UK
'GDP figures may ova/underestimate a counfy's
command over its income.
the five new German Ldnder
3)
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other three countries the increase was smaller than that registered in the Community as
a whole.
Progrex in nominal convergence mixcd
The recession had mixed effects on the nominal convergence performance of the
Community: on the one hand, it provoked a new deterioration in the average
budgetary position but, on the other, it contributed to the reduction of inflation.
While past budgetary trends are reviewed in greater detail in the next section, some of
the main features can be underlined here. Between 1991 and 1992 five Member
countries were able to reduce their budget deficits as a percentage of GDP
notwithstanding the economic slowdown. In 1993, however, general govemment net
borrowing expressed as a percentage of GDP increased in many Member States. The
public debt/GDP ratios also increased throughout the Community.
Significant progress was achieved on inflation. After its peak of 5.4 per cent in 1991
the private consumption deflator fell to 4.6 per cent in 1992 and to 3.8 per cent in
1993 despite the modest acceleration in import prices in 1993 and the impact of
various indirect tax increases.
Lower energy prices made a
significant contribution. A better
result was only achieved in 1987
(because of the fall in the price of oil)
and during two years in the 1960s.
The average of the three best
performing countries also declined
from 2.4 per cent in l99l (IRL, B,
DK) to 2.1 per cent in 1992 (DK, B,
F) and to 1.8 per cent in 1993 (DK,
IRL, NL). The trend of the deflator
of GDP was very similar (5.3 per
cent, 4.6 per cent and 3.6 per cent
respectively during the three years
1991 to 1993). Impressive as these
comparisons are, they should not lead
to complacency given that the
decline in inflation has been achieved
Table 5
Inflation
(Deflator of private
consumption)
Budget deficit
(Genaal government net
bonowing)
1991 1992 1993 1991 1992 1993
B
DK
WD
D
GR
E
F
lRL
I
L
NL
P
UK
2.5
2.5
3.8
18.4
6.3
3.0
2.3
6.9
2.9
3.4
11.1
7.4
2.1
1q
4.0
48
14.9
6.4
2.4
2.6
5.4
2.8
3.0
Y.I
4.8
2.8
1.4
3.4
4.0
13.7
4.7
2.3
' 2.0
4.4
J.b
1. 1
6.7
3.4
s.8
-z.t
-3.5
-3.2
16.3
-5.2
-2.1
-2.0
10.2
-1.0
-2.5
-o.o
-2.7
'-7.1
-2.6
-2.3
-2.6
-13.2
-4.6
'-3.8
'-2.3
-9.5
-2.5
-3.5
'-3.3
's.3
'-7.0
-4.4
'-2.8
. 
-:1.3
-15.5
-7.2
. 
-1i.5
'-12.3
'-9.4
-"t.5
'1.0
.'7 I
-t . I
-7.6
EC 5.4 4.6 3.8 -4.6 -5.0 '-6.0
European Commission estimates of November 1993 except for
the figures marked with an asterix where more recent
information has been included
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after a very long period of below potential
growth.
Some encouragement can be drawn from the
fact that wage trends, especially towards the
end of 1993 and at the beginning of 1994,
are moderating (see chart 11). In 1993,
nominal compensation per employee is
estimated to have increased by 4.1 per cent
for the Community as a whole. This figure
is much lower than those recorded in the
1970s and in the 1980s when inflation was
higher, but it is also substantially lower than
those recorded in the 1960s. The
comparison with this last period, however,
has lost much of its relevance since the high
nominal wage increases of those years were
made possible by high rates of increase in
productivity.
In 1993, the rate of inflation increased only in Luxembourg and Belgium and this was
due to a large extent to the consequences of indirect tax increases. Particularly
successful in reducing the rate of inflation were Portugal, the United Kingdom, Italy
and Spain, countries where the rate of inflation was above the Community average in
1992. Five Member States recorded encouraging rates of inflation of between two
and three and a half per cent while
Denmark experienced a rate of 1.4 per
cent (see table 5). Germany, which is
still suffering from the inflationary
consequences of unification, plus Spain
and Italy recorded rates of inflation of
between 4 and 4.7 per cent. The rate
of inflation remained well above the
Community average in Portugal and
especially in Greece. Although Greece has made considerable progress in reducing its
inflation during the past three years, the divergence of its price trends from the
Community average continues to be pronounced.
EC: inflation and wages
(deflator of pri€te consumptbn and nomrnal Mges per head;
excluding the nfl Geman Lender; annual 96 change)
20
18
'16
14
12
10
I
6
4
22{3-94
t0-
L.2 The policies
During the course of 1993, policy makers were confronted with very diffrcult choices.
On the one hand, the worsening of the recession and the concomitant increase in
unemployment were calling for a substantial stimulus to activity. On the other, the
worrying budgetary situations in most countries and the resilience of inflationary
pressures in some were suggesting the need for caution. The widening of the ERM
margins in August added a new dimension to the debate through the effective removal
ofthe exchange rate constraint.
The discussions in the European Council meetings in Edinburgh, Copenhagen and
Brussels and the initiatives that were decided on these occasions show that
employment and growth again became the priorities for concern in the Community.
This was reflected in the conduct of macroeconomic policy especially with regard to
the budgetary decisions taken by Member States. As a result of the decisions of
governments and central banks, the overall stance of macroeconomic policy in the
Community eased significantly. However, the heavy inheritance of the previous years
prevented economic policy from becoming as supportive to demand as the depth of the
recession would have called for.
At the same time, the severity of the situation increased the awareness of the need to
improve the functioning of the Community's economy through determined action in
the area of structural policies. Substantial progress in this respect took place,
especially in countries where resistance to change had previously been strong. At the
Community level, such concern led to the elaboration by the Commission, uiith
contributions from all the Member States, of the White Paper on "Grou.th,
Competitiveness and Employment" which was endorsed by the Brussels European
Council and transformed into an action plan to revitalise the economy.
1.2.I The inheritance from the recent past
The stance of economic policy in the course of 1993 was largely shaped by the very
unbalanced situation existing at the end of the previous year. In turn, this was the
result of past policy decisions to such an extent that it is useful to retrace the events
that led to the situation existing at the end of 1992.
i) 1987 to mid-1988. Between 1987 and 1988, the overall stance of economtc
policy in the Community became expansive. Monetary policy was loosened in the
2241334
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course of 1987 in response to the abating of inflationary pressures, the relative
weakness of economic activity and in application of the Louvre accord aiming to
prevent further falls in the value of the dollar vis-d-vis the European currencies.
An additional substantial loosening took place towards the end of 1987 as the
authorities attempted to prevent the sharp fall in share values from negatively
affecting consumption and investment.
Table 6: lnterest rates in the European Community *
Budgetary policy also supported economic activity. Between 1987 and 1988, the
cyclically adjusted budget deficit for the Community as a whole deteriorated by
about half a point (see table 7)t. This average figure is the result of a
discretionary loosening of budgetary policy in a majority of countries. In most
cases, the discretionary loosening took the form of cuts in fiscal receipts and was
Iargely the result of medium-term considerations.
This overall economic policy stance can be explained by the widespread fear that
the stock exchange crash might halt the hesitant recovery which had been under
way for some time. Indeed, the forecasts for 1988 produced at the turn of the
year by many private and public organisations were quite gloomy. In the case of
the European Community, the forecasts were suggesting growth of no more than
one and half per cent (the outturn was 4.2 per cent).
Mid-1988 to end of 1989. The authorities' policy reaction was probably very
effective in preventing the stock exchange crash from affecting confidence
In view of the difficulties to account correctly for the influence of the economic cycle on revenue and expenditure,
these figures are to be treated with caution. However uncertain the absolute figures may be, the direction of the
change remains significant.
1987
Dec.
1987
May
1988
Dec.
1988
Oct.
1989
tlec.
1989 1990 't991
May
1992
Dec.
1992
Short{erm
interest rates
8.4 8.0 7.5 9.5 11.3 11.7 11.4 10.8 10.7 1 1.0
Long-term
interest rates 9.0 9.4 9.0
o'l 9.8 10,2 10.9 10.2 9.6 9.6
long-term minus
short{erm +0.6 +1.4 +1.5 4.4 -1.5 -1.6 {.5 -0.6 44l. I -1.8
real short-term rates 5.0 4.7 4.2 5.0 5.8 6.1 5.4 c.o 7.1
real long-term rates 5.5 6.0 5.6 4.6 4.4 4.7 4.9 4.9 4.6 5.8
' Weighted averages for the Community. Real interest rates are computed using the consumer price index.
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Ghart 8
Short-term interest rates and Yield curves in
the Gommunity and in Germany since 1987
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However, it also stimulated an economy which was in a better state than the
economic evidence available at the end of 1987 suggested. Thanks also to
factors such as the internal market prograrnme, better investment profitability,
financial liberalisation and the delayed effects of the reduction in oil prices, the
pace of economic activity accelerated significantly. The recorded rate of groMh
in the Community in 1988, 4.2 per cent, was the strongest since 1976, and is
estimated to have overshot potential output growth by about one and a lhalf
percentage points (see chart I and table 8).
In response to the unexpected dynamism of the economy and to counter the risk
of renewed inflationary pressures, monetary policy was tightened throughout the
Community from mid-1988 onwards. Budgetary policy, on the other hand, was
only moderately tightened as many countries continued to implement previously
announced tax cuts. Notwithstanding the monetary tightening, the economy
continued to grow at a pace higher than potential growth. Capacity utilisation
reached a record level and inflationary pressures started to increase. Fuelled also
by a strong increase in import prices, inflation recorded a significant acceleration.
5 per cent in 1989 against 3.8 per cent in 1988.
iii) In 1990, budgetary policy became very expansionary with the estimated cyclic,ally
adjusted budget deficit deteriorating by 1.7 points of GDP and the actual defrcit
224334
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deteriorating by 1.3 points. This deterioration was due not only to developments
in Germany, where the unification-induced surge in spending came on top of the
tax reductions resulting from the last portion of the tax reform decided in 1988.
but also to the attempts of the governments of many other Member States to
counter the first signs of the incipient economic slowdown. Wage trends, which
had remained relatively under control up until the previous year, reacted to the
acceleration in inflation and as a result wage increases per head accelerated
strongly (7.4 per cent against 5.8 per in 1989; see table 9).
iv) 1991-1992. In the light of these developments monetary policy became even
more restrictive in l99T-92 notwithstanding the emerging weakness of activity, in
part reflecting the world-wide recession of 1991. This resulted largely from the
fact that i) financial integration and the quest for exchange rate stability had led to
a situation where monetary conditions in the Community were strongly influenced
Table 7: Main budgetary trends in the European Gommunity (% or cDp)
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Budget delicit - 4.0 - 3.4 -2.7 - 4.0 - 4.6 - 5.0 -6.0
Cyclically adjusted
budget deficit
- 3.6 - 4.1 - 3.9 - 5.6 - 5.7 - 5.7 - 5.9
Cyclically adjusted
receipts
u.7 43.4 43.1 42.6 43.7 M.5 ' 45.8
Cyclically adjusted tohl
expenditure
48.2 47.4 47.0 48.2 49.5 50.1 ' 51.7
Including he new German Ldnder fiom 1992 onuards ' European Cmrmission estimates of trtovemUei tggg
Table 8: Indicators of output and labour market tensions 1rc;
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 et1992 1993
Actual less potential rate
of gowtr (1)
0.5 1.5 0.6 0.0 -1 4 -1.6 -t.o
Capacity utilisation 82.6 84.0 85.6 85.0 82.1 80.4 77.6
Unanployment rate 10.4 9.8 8.9 8.3 8.8 07 10.9
lnfla[on (GDP deflator) 4.0 4.3 4.9 5.2 5.3 4.6 J.O
(1) Potential rate of groMh approximated by fre rate of gowth of tre capital stock (2) Including the new Gennan Linder
from 1992 onuards
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by conditions in Germany and ii) the latter was the country where the gap between
actual trends and the monetary authorities' objectives was the largest.
However, the cyclical positions of Member countries diverged. In West Germany
economic activity remained buoyant and the needs of unification induced a new.
strong, discretionary deterioration ofthe budget deficit in 1991. In the rest of the
community, however, activity was weakening while budgetary policy was
becoming moderately restrictive as some governments tried to rein in runaway
expenditure. Under these circumstances, authorities in the rest of the Community
lowered short term interest rates. The credibility that policy coordination, the
EMS parity grid and EMU prospects had acquired allowed these divergent trends
to continue for many months.
By mid-1992, however, doubts about the credibility of the existing ERM parity
grid became visible. With the political difticulties surrounding the ratification of
the Treaty on European Union acting as a catalyst, this situation led to the ERM
crisis of September 1992. At the same time, the Community economy plunged
into recession.
v) At the end of 1992, policy makers were forced to face the recession starting frqm
a very unbalanced policy situation whose main features were:
Table 9: Inflation, wage and profitability trends (European community)
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Inflation (Deflator of private
consumption)
3.6 3.8 5.0 4.5 5.4 4.6 ?e
Nominal uages per head 5.4 5.6 5.8 7.4 7.0 7.0 4.1
Real wages per head
(deflator of private
consumption)
Nominal Unit Labour Costs
Real Unit Labour Costs
(deflator of GDP)
Profitability (1 961 -73= 1 00)
17
3.6
- 0.4
82.7
1.8
2.8
-1,4
87.7
0.7
3.8
-1.0
91.2
2.7
6.0
0.7
90.0
1q
5.7
0.4
88.5
2.3
4.6
0.0
88.2
0.3
z.l
-0.9
86.3
lncluding the new German Linder from lg92 onuards
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Very worrying budgetary positions with budget deficits increasing in most
countries and debt/GDP ratios increasing in all.
lltage trends were beginning to adjust to the changed economic conditions but
wages per head were still increasing at a rate clearly incompatible with the
authorities' stability obj ectives.
Finally, monetary policy, notwithstanding a cautious start towards an easing
progess, remained very tight: interest rates were high, especially in real terms (see
table 6), and the yield curve was inverted and strongly negative.
1.2.2 Budgetary policy in 1993
Due to the widespread recession, no Member State could reduce its budget deficit
(general government net bonowing, national accounts definition which includes
central government, regional and local authorities and social security) as a percentage
of GDP in 1993. Seven countries, namely Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain,
Chart 9
Outstanding gross public debt and general
government net borrowing in the EC
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France, Portugal and the United Kingdom
registered considerable increases in their
deficits (see table 10). Particularly large
were the deteriorations recorded in Portugal,
Spain and the United Kingdom. In Italy the
deficit was contained by rigorous fiscal
measures. A number of Member States
chose to acknoledge the seriousness of the
economic downturn and allowed the
"automatic stabilisers" to operate, resulting in
some deterioration in their budgetary
positions. Some countries, for instance
France, the United Kingdom and Denmark
even took discretionary action to support
demand, although the room for manoeuvre
was very limited. In addition, all countries
proceeded to review their spending programmes with the aim of switching expenditure
towards those programmes which had the strongest effects on growth and
employment; public investment being the obvious example. In this respect, it is worth
noting that public investment increased from 2.6 points of GDP in 1988 to 3 points in
1993 notwithstanding the pressure on public expenditure exerted by the recession.
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Budgetary slippage led to sharply rising
debt/GDP ratios in most of the Member
countries. On average, the debt ratio
increased by almost 10 percentage points
from 56,5 per cent in 1989 to 65.9 per
cent in 1993. This automatically
created a growing interest burden for
national budgets. This type of
expenditure atready represents more than I I per cent of total public expenditure and
around SVzper cent of GDP. However, in 1993 the gradual reduction in interest rates
helped to mitigate this. While interest payments had increased by almost 14 per cent
in 1992, the increase was only 4 per cent in 1993.
Table 10
During 1993 it became clear, in Member States, that the scope for a budgetary
stimulation of the economy had been exploited and that any action in this direction
would have seriously affected policy credibility and would have had more negative
than positive effects on the economy as a whole.
Table 11
General government primary
balance (excludinq interest pavments)
General government net bonowing
percentages of GDP
1991 1992 1993 1991 1992 1993
B 3.9 4.3 3.7 '$.8 '-7.1 -7.0
DK 5.1 4.2 3.1 -2.2 -2.6 -4,4
D {.5 0.7 0.1 -3.2 -2.6 . -3.3
GR -3.5 0.4 {.5 -16.3 -13.2 -15.5
E -1.2 {.4 -2.2 -5.2 4.6 -7.2
F 1.0 4.5 -2.2 -2.1 ' -3.8 ' -5.5
IRL 5.6 4.9 4.2 -2.0 ' -2.3 ' -2.3
I 0.0 1.9 2.0 -10.2 -9.5 ' -9.4
L 4.4 -1.9 -1.7 -1.0 -2.5 -2.5
NL 3.6 2.7 2.3 -2.5 -3.5 -4.0
P 1.7 4.3 {.4 . $.6 ' -3.3 ' -7.1
UK 0.3 -J.U 4.5 -2.7 ' -6.3 ' -7.6
EC 0.4 0.4 -0.9 -4.6 -5.0 '$.0
European Cornmission estimates of November 1993 except for the figures marked with an asterix wtlere more recenl
information has been included
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Gross public debt rrr Interest payments
percentages of GDP
1991 1992 1993 1991 1992 1993
B et 129.5 tzt 131.9 (zt 138.4 10.6 11.2 10.7
DK (3) 64.2 (3) 68.4 (3) 80.6 7.3 6.8 7.5
D 42.1 44.8 48.9 2.8 3.3 3.5
GR 1r1 103.9 t+l 110.2 tct 121.2 12.8 13.6 15.0
E 45.2 48.2 55.9 4.0 4.2 5.0
F 35.5 39.5 44.1 3.1 3.4 3.7
IRL 97.0 94.5 99.0 7.7 7.1 7.3
I 101.4 108.0 118.1 10.2 11.4 12.0
L (5) 6.2 (5) 7.3 (st 10.0 0.6 u.b 0.8
NL 79.0 79.7 81.4 6.2 6.2 6.3
P 69.4 61.7 66.4 8.3 7.6 6.7
UK 35.8 41.8 (ol 48.8 3.0 2.9 3.1
EC 57.0 60.9 65.9 5.0 5.4 5.6
@(1)Genera|golanmentconso|idatedgossdebtatnornina|va|ue;(2)Socia|security
debt not included; (3) Govemment deposits with tre cenFal bank, government holdings of nonlovunment bonds and
pubtic enterprises related debt amounted to 17.8% of GDP in 1991, 20.1olo in '1992 and 27.3olo in 1993; (4) Milihry debt
not included. Various balances outstanding with tre banking sector not included for 1993 (5) Not consolidated. Social
securitv debt not included (6) End of financial year (31 March 1994)
1.2.3 Wage trends
Wage trends moderated substantially during the course of 1993. The average increase
in nominal wages per head for the year as a whole was 4.1 per cent against 7 per cent
in 1992 (see table 9). Given that productivity continued to increase, even if at the
cost of employment reductions being larger than the fall in output, this implied a
substantial deceleration in unit labour costs which are estimated to have increased in
1993 by 2.7 per cent against more than four per cent in 1992. Thus, average
Community trends improved substantially on the performance of the two/three
previous years, yet they still did not quite reach what was required for the achievement
of the authorities'stability objective. In addition, if compared to the developments in
Ch.rl 1'l
EC: inflation and wages
(deflatd of priEte coErptim 6nd wiml mg6 pet heEd;
excfudtE tE tw G€rmn Llr|der: arul% cfEnge)
I
I
4
the Community's main comPetitor
countries, wage increases in the EC were
still relatively high.
In some Member States, however, wage
developments were less satisfactory. In
Greece, the rate of increase in nominal
wages per head remained at the same high
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level of 1992 (above l l per cent); however, in inflation-adjusted terms wages fell. In
Spain and Portugal, wage increases slowed down compared with 1992 but were still
well above the Community average and clearly incompatible with rising
unemployment. On the other hand, Denmark, France and Italy recorded average
wage increases significantly below the Community average.
Notwithstanding the recession, real wage costs per head increased, even if only slightly
(+0.5 per cent in real terms). Since their increase fell short of productivity increases
by about a percentage point, their trend contributed to improving investment
profitability. Indeed, the average outcome for 1993 was in line with the rule of thumb
suggested both in the White Paper and the Economic Policy Guidelines (real wage cost
increases per head one percentage point below productivity increases).
Towards the end of the year, signs appeared which suggested that wage increases
were moderating further and that the conflict between wage trends and price stability,
which had been a distinctive feature of the policy mix of the 1990-92 period, could be
disappearing.
1.2.4 Monetary policy
For the Community as a whole, monetary conditions eased significantly during 1993
both before and after the new ERM crisis of July. Short-term interest rates also fell
in most countries and, even though inflation was declining, real short term rates fell (a
reduction of more than four points in nominal short term rates and about three ancl a
half points in real short term rates; December 1993 over December 1992, Community
average, see table 16). Long term yields also continued to decline in nominal ternns
but yield curves became much less inverted than had been the case at the beginning of
the year.
These trends were not continuous during
the course ofthe year. Indeed, for several
countries there was considerable volatility
both in interest rates and in exchange rates
as periods of turbulence continued to
afflict the ERM. The year began with
very heavy pressure on the French Franc
which eased after a repeat of the previous
12
EC: Real short and long term interesl
06 (Otrnart fiottls: lddld ntct ba3 ffid nta o{ fttiodl10m
l q t rates
22{13-94
-19-
Chart 13
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September's joint declaration of support
for the parity by the French and German
governments and central banks. But
French short-term interest rate
differentials remained high throughout
the first quarter of 1993. At the end of
January, after a period of intense market
pressure, the bilateral central rates of the
Irish pound were reduced by 10 per cent.
Immediately afterwards, the Danish krone
came under very heavy Pressure.
However, concerted intervention and a
reduction in Bundesbank interest rates
calmed the foreign exchange markets.
In the Spring, after the French general
elections were over and the new
government had reaffirmed the "franc fort" policy, pressures on the French Franc
eased rapidly, allowing differentials vis-i-vis the DM to fall and, by late June, to
become negative. Indeed, short rates were below German levels in all other narrow-
band countries except Denmark (whose remaining positive differential was very small).
In the wide band, however, the Spanish Peseta and the Portuguese Escudo were again
devalued in May, the former currency by 8 per cent and the latter by 6.5 per cent.
During July, generalised tension developed linked to market perceptions of weak or
declining activity, rising unemployment and/or worsening public finance situations in a
number of the countries whose monetary policies were tied to those of Germany. In
such circumstances. markets believed that the countries concerned would have had
difficulty in conducting a prolonged defence of the narrow bands via increased interest
rates.
At the beginning of August, the decision was taken by the authorities to widen the
ERM bands to +/- 15oh for all participating currencies2 without changing the central
rates. The widening of the bands had the effect of re-introducing an effective two-way
risk into the system. Markets had to assess the sustainability of the monetary policy
stance in each country on the grounds of fundamentals, undisturbed by a need for
exceptionally high interest-rate differentials. tnitially, several currencies depreciated
? The Dutch and German authorities announced a bilateral agreement, outside the ERM framework, to maintain their
currencies within bilateral bands of +l' 2/.%.
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significantly against the DM. Subsequently, reductions in German interest rares
allowed reductions in other ERM countries.
Table 12: Nominal effective exchange rates (quarterty figures; 1992-t= 100)
Cyclical conditions in some of these countries showed signs of relative improvement
vis-d-vis Germany, differentials declined and most former narrow-band currencies
returned, by the end of 1993, to within their former bands. This development, i.e. the
fact that the authorities concerned did not feel it appropriate to use the additional
room for manoeuvre opened up by the August decision, has positive implications for
economic and monetary cooperation.
Table 13 :
Monetary and credit targets in 1993Outside the ERI\A the pound sterling
reached a trough in late January following
a reduction in interest rates to 6 per cent
but subsequently recovered fbirly steadily
throughout the rest of the year. A further
cut in UK interest rates took place in
November in a context of declining
interest rates elsewhere in Europe. The
Italian Lira experienced sharp fluctuations
during the course of the year, mainly
limited to market perceptions of the
impact of political events.
Target Outcome
fannual rale)
D M3 4.5 - 6.5 8.1 (Dec)
F tvl2
M3 {new) 4 -6.5
0.0 (s3-rv)
-1.5 {93-tV)
E M3
ALP + CP
ALP
A-7t-t
4.5
8.1 (Dec)
7.5 (Dec)
8.6 (Dec)
PSCE 1r1
M2 5 -7 7.9 (Dec)
UK M4
MO
J -y
0-4
4.9 (Nov)
5.8 (Dec)
(1) Domestic credit to the private sector
1992-il1 1992-tV 199$l 199&tl 1993-il1 1993-lV
B 102.14 104.18 104.27 103.61 101.04 100.54
DK 103.59 106.07 147.U 106.47 101.52 103.07
D 103.42 105.53 105.68 104.60 104.43 105.1 3
GR 95.68 92.76 90.35 88.46 85.76 u.07
E 99.90 92.33 92.38 87.20 81.15 80.81
F fi3.72 106.05 106.35 106.02 102.70 103.52
IRL 102.57 105.19 99.73 96.23 93.07 94.32
I 100.06 88.58 81.62 82.30 80.57 77.83
NL 102.12 104.49 104.88 104.29 104.35 105.17
P 102.41 101.65 100.10 96.39 90.42 89.29
UK 100.78 88.39 86.79 88.76 89.79 89.85
EC 105.79 98.59 95.03 93.87 90.13 89.93
Relative to their 20 (9 for the EC as a whole) most important trading partners 
i
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The turbulence in the ERM was one factor contributing to contrasting developments in
monetary aggregates. Of the Community countries that set targets for the aggregates,
there was overshooting in Germany, Spain and (outside the ERM) Italy, while there
was a very substantial undershooting in the case of France. In the overshooting
countries, the link between the aggregates and final variables (underlying inflation
slowed in all three countries while activity was flat or falling) appeared to be less
strong than in the past; but in France the undershoot (after allowing for special factors)
appears to have been also related to a weakness in the growth of nominal income that
probably continued into the final quarter ofthe year.
chart 14 Exchange rates in the Community
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1.2.5 Structurat adjustment policies
Member States have recently taken important measures in the field of structural policy.
In particular, various countries started or continued privatisation programmes (Italy,
France, Spain, Belgium, Ireland, Portugal), reduced or re-orientated subsidies
(Germany and Ireland) or lifted administrative and legal barriers to market entry
(Greece).
Various countries have undertaken bold steps to improve training programmes and to
target them more towards school-leavers and the unemployed (United Kingdom,
France). Almost all countries have taken measures to help small businesses. These
measures range from fiscal incentives, to start-up help and to the simplification of
administrative procedures. Italy has taken important measures aimed at improving the
functioning of its public administration.
Measures related to the labour market and labour costs have also been taken. In
Spain, structural reform, especially of the labour market (for instance the legalisation
of private employment agencies), is an important element in government polic'y
considerations. In Italy, the abolition of the indexation of wages ("scala mobile") irn
1992 was followed in July 1993 by an agreement that future wage developments must
be consistent with agreed inflation targets as well as a number of measures to increase
the flexibility of the labour market. In Belgium, the "Global Plan" has introduced a
new index for the adaptation of wages (the "health index" which excludes tobacco,
alcohol and petrol prices) as well as a real wage freeze for 1995-96. In Germany, the
social partners have agreed to an extended timetable for the equalisation of wages
between the eastern and western part of the country for some key industrial sectors.
In order to improve labour supply, some relevant aspects of the social security system
were tackled. More stringent eligibility requirements for payment of pensions
(increase of retirement age and/or qualifying period) were introduced in France, Italy.
Portugal and the United Kingdom and stricter rules regarding payment of
unemployment benefits were enforced in Belgium and Spain. In order to reduce thrl
high level of social security contributions, employer's charges for certain categories
were cut in Belgium, France, Ireland and Spain. The United Kingdom has launched il
scheme designed to encourage employers to invest in developing their training
strategies so that the skills of the workforce are improved.
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Although some of these measures will bear fruit only in the medium term and although
structural measures are especially unpopular in times of recession, Member States have
to continue these structural adjustment effiorts in order to allow for a smooth
development of the economy and the labour market in the years to come. The
decision of the Brussels European Council to establish an action plan based on the
White Paper will contribute to a more effective implementation of structural reform
both at the national and the European levels.
L.2.6 The Edinburgh and Copenhagen Growth Initiative
The Edinburgh Growth Initiative was launched by the European Council in December
1.992 as a reaction to the slowdown in economic activity in the early 1990s. It was
created as an instrument to promote economic recovery and employment via
investment, for instance in physical infrastructure in the areas of transport, energy,
communications and environment, with the priority being given to the development of
Trans-European Networks (TENs). It was geared to exploit all possible margins for
manoeuvre in national public budgets and to boost the confidence of economic agents
without departing from the objective of medium-term budgetary consolidation.
Progress in relation to the Growth Initiative has been closely followed by the EcoFin
Council and the Copenhagen and Brussels European Councils of June and December
1993. These reviews have confirmed the broad strategy to be followed. Firstly, the
measures taken in relation to the Growth Initiative must be consistent with the
medium-term requirements of the Treaty on European Union. Secondly, they must
strike a balance between providing a short-term stimulus to economic activity without
jeopardising longer term growth prospects and finally, they must include a combination
of measures at the Communitv and national levels.
In 1993, loans of almost ECU 3,4 billion were granted to 59 projects under the
temporary lending facility of ECU 8 billion (including the additional ECU 3 billion
agreed by the Copenhagen Council) established by the European Investment Bank.
The total investment involved in these projects is estimated at ECU 29,1 billion.
Progress towards the establishment of a European Investment Fund has been slower
than expected, but substantial progress has been achieved in accelerating investment
under the new Cohesion Fund's financial instrument. Following the submission of
eligible projects by the four countries concerned by the Cohesion Fund, the
(51
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Commission approved total appropriations of over ECU 1500 million in respect of
more than 230 Projects.
With the establishment of the new generation of "Community Support Framework",
ECU g billion will be available for investment in 1994 from the Union's structural
funds. The need for increased resources for SMEs has been addressed through the
adoption by the Council of a new multi-annual action programme involving overall
expenditure of ECU 112,2 million of which ECU 85 million represents new support
decided in the framework of the $owth initiative. Furthermore, the Copenhagen
European Council provided for additional loans of ECU I billion under the EIB
temporary lending facility for measures to improve the job creation potential of SMEs,
with an interest rate subsidy linked to employment creation. unfortunately, the
implementation of this measure has encountered some obstacles which have delayed its
effects.
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Section 2: The outlook for 1994 and beyond
At the beginning of 1994 there are signs that the sharp deterioration in confidence and
in other survey indicators, which occurred in the first half of last year, has been
arrested and in some cases has even shown some improvement. While some of the
evidence is conflicting, the overall impression is that the Community may well have
reached the trough of the recession. The latest indicators, however, provide little
evidence of a rapid upturn. At the end of last year, the Commission services had
forecast Community GDP to grow by a modest l tA per cent in 1994 and about 2 per
cent in 1995. Despite the considerable risks characterising the outlook, the evidence
which has become available in the interim does not suggest any need to modify this
projection.
On the basis of the above Commission projections, the jobless total will continue to
grow in both forecast years reaching ll% per cent in 1995, the highest recorded rate
in Community history, before starting to decline. Inflation is expected to be reduced
further, while progress towards reducing budgetary deficits will be slowed down by
the slow pace of the recovery.
Table 14: The Community economy : use and supply of goods and
services
(annual real percentage change) 1993 1994 a) 1995 al
Private consumption
Government consumption
Gross fixed capital formation
-0.1
0.5
-4.6
0.3
0.5
2.O
1.3
0.4
4.5
Domestic demand (incl. stocks)
Exports of goods and services u;
lmports of goods and services o)
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
-1.3
3.6
-3.1
- 0.3
1.0
5.7
2.6
1.3
1.9
5.8
3.9
2.1
a) Forecasts b) Extra-Community trade only
The figures presented in table 14 reflect the mid-point of a wide range of possible
outcomes. The uncertainties attached to these forecasts are particularly high on this
occasion given that the Community's economy is apparently close to a turning point
and therefore that consumer confidence, notoriously difficult to predict, will play a
major role. Small changes in the saving behaviour of households can produce
significant variations in the rate of growth of private consumption, which is by far the
largest component of total demand. A worse than expected outcome could emerge if
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investor confidence does not begin to appear in a form more convincing than it does at
present. On the other hand, a stronger.recovery could materialise if the Community's
export performance improved substantially and/or the present tentative signs of upturn
were to prove sufficient to rekindle consumer confidence. In both cases, investment,
which is expected to pick up somewhat because of cyclical factors and because of
lower borrowing costs, could be stimulated further. The subsequent paragraphs will
assess the relative strengths of the growth depressing and promoting factors which are
inherent in the Community's short term outlook and will stress the high degree of risk
in terms of accurately predicting the likely course of events in the Community over the
next two years.
G rowth depres si n g factors
A pessimistic viewpoint could be justified by the cohtinuing influence, although
admittedly diminishing, of some of the main recessionary forces of the last two years:
tight monetary conditions, the difficulty of EC firms to profit from a relatively benign
international economic environment and the continuation of low levels of confidence
amongst economic agents, especially consumers.
Despite the reductions which have taken place in the course of 1993, short tenm
interest rates remain high given the cyclical position of the Community's economy. A
continued cautious monetary easing in 1994 appears to be largely discounted by both
consumers and investors so that a process of accelerated cuts in borrowing costs may
be required in order to provide the basis for an upswing in economic sentiment and
22{3€4
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activity. Such an acceleration could take place if the current trend towards a
reduction in inflationary pressures were to be confirmed over the coming months.
Furthermore, while the outlook is for a gradual strengthening in world output and
trade growth in 1994 and 1995, and while the Community's external competitiveness
in both cost and non-cost terms remains relatively weak, Community exporters might
not be able to fully benefit from this strengthening. Continuing low levels of business
and consumer confidence could also be a constraining factor on growth in 1994 due to
the ongoing uncertainty generated both by high and rising rates of unemployment and
the credibility damage inflicted by currency upheavals to the prospects for EMU.
In addition to the ongoing influence of a number of the growth-constraining factors of
previous years, one additional specific factor could take on an increasingly important
role in 1994 and 1995. Given the alarming pace of deterioration in the budgetary
situation in some Member States, a number of Member States have either announced
or started to implement ambitious budget consolidation programmes in the closing
months of last year. These prograrnmes are essential to put countries' budgetary
positions on a more sustainable and firm footing following the sharp deteriorations
which have occurred over recent years and are a vital precondition for the re-
establishment of a robust medium-term growth path in the economies concerned.
While the longer-term benefits are not in doubt, it is not clear the extent to which the
demand-dampening impact of such fiscal retrenchment strategies in the short-run can
be offset by any potential crowding-in effects resulting from lower interest rates and
increased levels of confidence. To the extent that these programmes can convince
economic agents that the authorities have it within their power to reduce budget
deficits, the crowding in effects will be stronger.
Growth promoting factors
A more optimistic viewpoint could be justified by a more sanguine assessment of the
behaviour of consumers, based, for instance, on the progress made in reducing the
indebtedness of households. Their savings ratio could drop by more than expected
and private consumption could recover more strongly thus creating a virtuous
consumption/investment circle. Even in the absence of such a development,
investment could improve faster than predicted. Following a decline of over 4t/z
percentage points last year, fixed capital formation is currently forecast to grow by 2
per cent in 1994 with a further strengtheningto 4t/z per cent forecast for 1995. A
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large number of factors could combine to produce a stronger investment-driven upturn
in the CommunitY:
a fo[owing some years of contraction, a revival in investment levels is likely for
purely cyclical reasons;
o moderation in both employee compensation rates and in nominal unit labour costs
has made a substantial contribution to investment profitability, which is now
higher than at the same point of previous cycles (see chart 5);
O the coming on stream of projects resulting from specific incentive schemes to
switch public expenditure towards infrastructure investment and other growth
promoting caPital investments;
O a stronger than expected improvement in Community competitiveness as a result
of a lower increase in unit labour costs and/or a lower than expected effective
exchange rate of the Community's currencies;
o expectations of a more benign domestic demand environment as a result of more
favourable trends in the areas just mentioned combined with moderate and
decreasing energy Prices,
O improved external demand prospects as a result of the dynamism of some
important economies and of the completion of the GATT agreement.
An acceleration of the present trend towards lower borrowing costs would combine
favourably with these factors and could lead to a faster than expected recovery'
With regard to the improved external
demand prospects mentioned above, it is
important to examine the overall trends in
relation to world output and trade as well as
examining the performance of individual
countries or groups of countries. Firstly, it
should be underlined that the outlook for
world output growth in 1994 and 1995 has
become a little more favourable in recent
months. This increased optimism emanates
essentially from the more dynamic than
expected performance which has become
evident in the case of the United States and
Canada. In overall terms, output groMh for
the world, excluding the EC, is expected to
Table 15: World Growth
GDP /GNP (annual real % change)
1991 1992 1993 1994 199s
EC 1.4 1.1 {J.J 1.3 z. l
USA -0.8 2.6 3.0 ?q, 2.6
JAPAN 4.4 1.3 {.1 0.8 2.8
EFTA -0.5 {.3 -0.4 1'7Lt 2.9
WORLD 0.8 1.7 1.6 2.6 ?'l
IMPORTS (annualreal 06 change)
OECD 1.5 3.6 1.0
qn 3.1
DAE a) 14.1 .tn'l 13.8 12.3 12.2
LDC b) 10.0 14.6 12.2 8.8 d.Y
World
exc. EC
1.8 6.2 8.4 8.5 8.0
WORLD 3.0 5.0 3.4 6.4
European Cornmission forecasts
a) DAE: Dynamic Asian Economies
b) Less Developed Counties (excluding DAEs, OPE0 and
the counfies of Cental and Eastern Europe)--
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be about a quarter ofa percentage point higher for both 1994 and 1995 than expected
at the time of the Autumn 1993 forecasts, with three percent now being forecast for
the present year and three and a half percent envisaged for 1995. With regard to
world trade the present view is also more optimistic than that which prevailed in
OctoberA'{ovember of 1993 and again as with GDP growth the main explanarory
factor is the perforrnance of the United States. Not only is the growth performance of
the United States expected to be higher than in 1994 and 1995 than previously
thought, its import propensity is also expected to increase. In overall terms, world
trade excluding the EC, measured by import volumes, is assumed to increase by eight
to eight and a half percent over the forecasting period which is roughly one percentage
point higher than the assumption underlying the Autumn 1993 forecast. It is
important for Community exporters to more actively exploit these additional external
opportunities which are evidently emerging.
Medium-ternt projectionr poiot to a wide range of outcomes
The available medium to long-term projections for the Community show that a wide
range of outcomes is possible. If economic trends in 1994 and 1995 develop as in the
central scenario of the Commission's economic forecasts, there will be a good
probability that the rate of growth could reach 3 per cent by 1996 and that
unemployment could start falling. This outcome is conditional on the expected
gradual strengthening of exports, investment and consumer confidence, but even more
so on the avoidance of some pitfalls. The first is that the conflict between price
stability objectives and wage behaviour, which has now almost entirely disappeared,
does not arise again. The second is that the authorities' ability to take control, over
the medium term, of the budgetary situation becomes and remains credible. This is
important in order not to overburden monetary policy, to maintain a balanced policy-
mix with low interest rates, to maintain confidence and to get under way the necessary
process of increasing national savings.
But even if these errors are avoided and the Community's economy returned to a
growth path of around three per cent, this will be difiicult to maintain and the expected
reduction in unemployment will be small unless the potential rate of growth is also
increased. To achieve the objective of reducing substantially the rate of
unemployment, the White Paper underlined the need to act decisively to strengthen the
dynamism of the Community's economy, to increase its potential rate of growth and to
make growth more employment intensive.
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The dynamism of the Community's economy will be strengthened by the full
exploitation of the possibilities offered by its internal market, by the maintenance of an
open trading system, additional efforts to improve training systems and research efficrts
and by the rapid completion of the planned infrastructure networks (TENs). In
addition. there is a continued need to reform the legal and institutional framework in
which the productive process takes place with a view to adapt it to market needs, to
the new international and technological environment and to the need of making growth
environmentally sustainable.
Increasing the potential rate of growth of the Community depends on creating the
conditions which will bring about an increase in the rate of growth of the capital stock
and, by necessity, an increase in the share of investment in GDP. As the White Paper
has stressed, this depends on many factors, some of which cannot be controlled
directly by policy makers, but requires in any case a further increase in investment
profitability and an increase in national savings. These two trends depend in turn on
real wages continuing to increase less than average productivity and on the public
sector returning to positive rates of saving which implies substantially lower budget
deficits.
A more employment intensive growth pattern will require action in a large number of
areas which have been indicated in the White Paper. In particular, efforts will have to
be continued to improve the efficiency of labour markets, to give them greater
flexibility, to adapt working time to the needs of employers and employees, to review
the effects on employment of the arrangements to finance social security and to reduce
as far as possible non-wage costs on the lowest wages and on those of young workers.
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Section 3 The policies for more
employment
growth and
The White Paper on "Growth, Competitiveness and Employment" clearly indicated
that to substantially reduce unemployment the Community needed to return to
sustained rates of growth and to strengthen the capacity of the European Economy ro
create jobs. In so far as the latter area is concerned, the framework defined in the
White Paper will serve as a reference for Member States' policies and the Commission
will be monitoring the progress made.
To achieve a stronger rate of growth, the Economic Policy Guidelines adopted last
December by the Community have confirmed the macro-economic part of the strategy
presented in the White Paper which was aimed at:
D sustaining the recovery without putting at risk the prospects for sustained growth
in the medium term;
ii) increasing the dynamism of the economy and its potential rate of growth so as to
be able to reach and sustain stronger rates of growth.
3.1 Sustaining the recovery
The current economic situation of the Community calls for very difficult policy
choices. As noted in section l, the Community's economy taken as a whole, appears
to have reached the trough ofthe recession but the recovery is, and indeed is expected
to be, hesitant and slow. Supply conditions are better than at the same point of
previous cycles but demand expectations remain very subdued. Exports towards the
rest of the world appear to be picking up but their small relative weight (about l0 per
cent of GDP) makes it unlikely that very strong growth impulses can be expected from
this direction. Investment is showing some signs of improvement but it is unlikely to
pick up strongly until overall demand prospects clearly improve.
Across the Community, the general consensus view among the relevant authorities is
that the room for manoeuvre is limited. The unsatisfactory budgetary situation is
largely due to the fact that fiscal policy has not only been used to counter the effects of
the recession but has started from a position of structural imbalance. The conclusion
in the jointly agreed Economic Policy Guidelines is that further slippage in the present
situation could only produce very short term benefits, which in all likelihood would be
(61
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more than offset by the adverse reaction in financial markets and a further weakening
ofconfidence.
Wage increases have slowed down considerably and this has contributed to lower
inflation and improved competitiveness and profitability. Despite possible downward
pressure on aggregate demand, the general view in Member States is that the risk of
some future wage and price inflation cannot be entirely ruled out. Inflation in the
Community at 3 Vz per cent (deflator of private consumption) in 1994 represents a
considerable improvement on the recent past but more is needed to achieve the
Guidelines' target and the aim of squeezing inflation out of the system remains a
priority. Again success on this point will improve expectations and serve to boost
confidence.
At the same time, there is a strong commitment to measures aimed at improving
market functioning to increase the dynamism of the economy and to oflset any
disincentives to increase productivity which might result from a policy of wage
restraint.
Under these conditions, the White Paper had reached the conclusion, implicitly
confirmed by the Guidelines, that the most significant contribution economic policy
could make to sustaining the recovery was to continue to make progress towards
eliminating the conflict between the stability objective and wage and budgetary
behaviour. This would allow short term interest rates to fall even more than presently
expected and would have substantial positive effects on the behaviour of both
consumers and business. This is particularly important since the easing of monetary
conditions in the Community has not yet proceeded to the point at which the stance is
consistent with a strong recovery in activity in the Comrhunity, especially in the light
of the budgetary retrenchment in prospect for 1994 and beyond in many Member
States. The following paragraphs will discuss the present stance of monetary policy
and the progress achieved in creating the conditions for lower interest rates.
3.1.1 The current monetary policy stance
Short-term rates of interest, as noted in section I above, fell significantly in late 1992
and into 1993. Indeed, in a period ofjust over a year (September 1992 to October
1993), short rates in Germany, the ERM anchor country, fell by around 375 basis
points while on average in the Community they fell by more than 500 basis points
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between September 1992 and January 1994. These are large and rapid reductions in
historical terms, yet short term interest rates are still too high given the cyclical
position of the Community's economy. The reduction in short rates have been made
possible in Germany by clear evidence of a substantial downward trend in underlying
inflation (evident for some time in producer prices and now increasingly translated into
moderate wage settlements and decelerating consumer price movements) and,
elsewhere in Europe, by inflation rates that in several countries are already consistent
with a medium-term price stability standard and continue to trend downwards.
Table 16: Recent interest-rate developments in the community
Monetary policy should continue the course that was followed with a considerable
degree of success in 1993. One indicator of that success was the much-reduced
degree of inversion of the yield curve while long rates were falling. The main effect
on the yield curve of a continuation of 1993 monetary policy trends would probably be
a further pivoting effect, with short rates continuing to fall and with long rates little
changed.
Against this background, the strength of economic growth in the United States and the
consequent probable tendency of US short rates to move upwards might go together
with a further upward movement in the value of the dollar. Given the rapid US
growth rate and the sluggishness - as yet - of the European economy such a
development would not be inappropriate for either party.
However, it should be recalled that the significant reductions in short-term interest
rates in Europe in 1993 depended not only on progress in disinflation but also on some
progress towards the establishment of better prospects for medium-term budgetary
Dec 92 Feb 93 Aor 93 Jun 93 Auq 93 Oct 93 Dec 93 Jan 94
Short term interest rates '1 1.0 10.2 9.2 8.1 7.9 7q 6.9 6.7
Long term interest rates 9.6 8.8 8.7 8.1 7.4 7.0 6.6 6.5
fong{erm minus short-
term
-1.4 -1.4 1.2 0.0 -0.5 {.5 {.3 4.2
Real short -term rates 7.1 6.4 5.6 4,7 4.2 4.1 3.6 3.2
Real long term 5.8 5.1 5.1 4.7 3.8 3.6 3.3 3.0
Weighted ave€ges for he Community, short term: 3 monhs Eteq Long-tem: 10 years ; real rates OeRateO ufrffi
consumer price index
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consolidation. That requirement still remains, while a continuation of the declining
trend in interest rates and, thereby, an improvement in growth prospects will help the
process of reducing budget deficits (in several countries, these had risen in L992/93
not only as a result of the automatic impact of recession, but also because attempts
were made to provide budgetary support to activity). However, the countries in
which budgetary problems may represent an independent barrier to a further easing of
monetary conditions are often those in which there is a need for further progress in
disinflation.
3.1,.2 Progress in creating the conditions for lower interest rates
Favourable developments have appeared in the trends for costs and prices over recent
months. ll/age trends appear to have moderated substantially and the outcome for
1994 might even be lower than was suggested by the forecasts completed at the end of
last year. These forecasts pointed to a reduction in the rate of increase in
compensation of employees per head from 7.0 per cent in 1992 to 4.1 percent in 1993
and to about 3 Yz per cent this year. Given an expected increase in labour productivity
ofabout I Vz percent this year, partly due to labour shedding, the average increase of
unit labour costs in the Community should decelerate to below 2 percent, the lowest
rate in the Community since 1960 and broadly consistent with the Community's
inflation targets. In addition, the evidence which has become available after the
completion of the forecasts suggest that the outcome might even be slightly better. If
confirmed, these indications suggest that a considerable step towards consistency with
the stability objective of the monetary authorities is being made.
However, as with all average outturns, individual country performances differ
markedly. According to the available forecasts, nearly half of the Member States are
expected to register increases of less than 3 to 3 t/z per cent, a trend which must be
maintained and improved in 1995 and beyond. A number of countries, however,
continue to show rates of increase clearly inappropriate to a situation of rising
unemployment and incompatible with the price stability target of the Community (no
more than 2 to 3 per cent by 1996) In Spain, compensation of employees per head is
forecast to increase by 5Yz percent this year despite the severe fall in economic activity
and the sharp rise in unemployment. In Portugal, wage increases were forecast to
grow by 6 % percent in 1994 which is less than half the rate in 1992, but still close to
twice the Community average. The most recent information suggests that the
deceleration could be even more pronounced. Overall Spain and Portugal are
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expected to register declines in their rates of
wage increase of between I l/2-2
percentage points. Greece, on the other
hand, is forecast to have a rate of increase
of close to four times the Community
average. However, it should be pointed
out that recently announced 1994 wage
increases in Greece for central government
staff are below the rate of predicted inflation as opposed to the assumption of real
increases embodied in the Autumn 1993 forecasts. If the government can hold the
line on public sector pay, and on the assumption that the recently negotiated
agreements in the private sector will be effectively implemented, rates of increase in
compensation of employees per head could be lYz-Z percentage points lower in 1994
than previously thought.
Encouraging signals have also come from Germany where important pay agreements
pointing in the right direction have been reached. If the trend is continued in the
forthcoming agreements, the outcome for 1994 could even be significantly better than
the forecasted 3 per cent. A global agreement both for the public and the private
sector has been reached in Ireland: wages should increase by about 2 t/z per cent a year
in the period 1994-96. Several pay deals of between 2 and 3 per cent for 1994 have
also been concluded in some important sectors in the United Kingdom and average pay
increases are quite low.
Price trends are also rather satisfactory. The forecasts point to a new deceleration in
the rate of increase in the deflator of private consumption to 3.5 per cent this year
against 3.8 per cent in 1993 and 4.6in1992. For 1995 a new deceleration to a rate of
3.2 per cent is forecast. This suggests that the Community and most Member States
are on course towards meeting the target agreed in the Economic Policy Guidelines of
achieving a rate of inflation of no more than2 to 3 per cent by 1996. lndeed, also in
this case, the most recent figures suggest that the outcome could be even better than
this forecast. The appreciation of the dollar, if sustained, might add a few decimals to
the rate of inflation, but this is likely to be more than offset by the probable better
wage outcome and weak energy prices. Very positive signals are also coming from
producer prices in many countries.
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Most countries are expected to record rates of inflation consistent with the guidelines'
target or very close to it. The pace of price increases remains unsatisfactory,
however, in Greece (where the rate of inflation is declining, but at a slow speed) and
to a much lesser extent in Portugal. Additional efforts might be desirable in Spain and
Italy. The measures that some of these countries have taken to reduce costs and
which were presented in the above paragraphs should also produce positive effects on
the rates of inflation.
The badgetary picture is more difficult to assess. The first recommendation
concerning budgetary policy of the Economic Policy Guidelines was to prevent any
further deterioration in the budget deficits in 1994 and to carry forward the process of
deficit reduction. All countries, except Denmark and Ireland, are attempting a
discretionary tightening of policy and are aiming to reduce deficits in 1994. Success
in reducing total deficits in 1994, in accordance with government plans, will depend
not only on the scale and effectiveness of the discretionary adjustment measures being
introduced, but also on whether the.recovery in economic activity proceeds as
expected and on the savings on interest payments to be achieved from lower interest
rates. The depth of the recession and the slow pace of the recovery will limit the
improvement in the deficits of several countries. Indeed, cyclically adjusted estimates
suggest that practically all countries will be reducing their structural deficits this year.
For the Community as a whole this reduction is expected to amount to about three
quarters of a per cent of GDP, but more than half of this improvement is likely to be
offset by the direct effects of the enduring weakness in economic activity. Most
countries appear to have taken significant steps to check the increase in current
expenditure. Public sector pay, in particular, is increasing substantially less than the
rate of inflation.
Looking more closely at the budgetary situations of the individual Member States in
relation to the guidelines, the prospects for 1994 are generally more encouraging than
in 1993 but the adjustment efforts will have to be pursued in most cases over several
years. The guidelines stressed that an immediate strong pursuit of the consolidation
process was especially necessary for Member States with very high and rising public
debt ratios. In this respect, in both Belgium and Italy the appreciable discretionary
tightening already carried out in 1993 is being pursued further in 1994 with positive
results, even though growth is likely to remain relatively weak. But given the
seriousness of their debt positions these efforts may need to be reinforced by additional
measures if there is any slippage from targets. In Greece, by contrast, the measures so
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far announced do not appear sufficient to achieve a significant correction and without
a substantial additional adjustment there is a danger that interest payments will put
upward pressure on the already very high deficit.
The guidelines also recommended that the consolidation process should intensi$ in
those Member States with high budget deficits and which are expected to face a
relatively favourable economic situation in 1994. With the recovery clearly established
in the United Kingdom (in advance of the continental European economies), the
British government presented two budgets in 1993 (in March and in November) which
introduced a significant fiscal tightening based on strict public expenditure control and
substantial tax increases (being phased in over two years). In Denmark, the
government has introduced a tax-cutting fiscal stimulus which will lead to a
deterioration in the budget deficit this year, but it has followed this policy in the
context of a medium-terrn strategy for budgetary consolidation and has already
announced tax increases for 1995 and beyond. Ireland is likely to be the fastest-
growing Community economy in 1994; and its budget deficit is already low and its
debt ratio over the last number of years has been on a declining trend, thus allowing
room this year for a modest budgetary relaxation (tax cuts for the lower paid).
Luxembourg is in an even more favourable budgetary position and is not faced by the
consolidation needs confronting most of its Community partners.
Most of the other Member States are looking for some improvement in their deficits in
1994 through tight budgetary control, as recommended in the guidelines, but they are
not seeking a major correction in budgetary imbalances in the current year because of
the continuing weak state of their economies and concerns about the possible short-
term impact on demand and the recovery of an over-abrupt fiscal tightening. In such
circumstances, as stressed in the guidelines, it is especially necessary to establish
credible medium-term strategies for deficit reduction over the next few years. France,
Germany, Portugal and Denmark have recently presented new or updated convergence
programmes, and other countries, especially those whose earlier budgetary strategies
have been knocked oFtrack by the recession, also need to restate their objectives and
how they intend to achieve them. As suggested in the guidelines, credibility can be
enhanced by announcing measures now which will take effect in future years as the
recovery strengthens; measures ofthis kind have already been announced on the tax
side by, for example, Germany, the United Kingdom and Denmark, and several other
countries have announced reforms likely to have a strong impact on various categories
of social spending over future years.
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The expected better growth performance next year walrants a bolder step towards the
necessary medium-term budgetary consolidation. It is urgent that all countries revise
their convergence programmes to take into account the most recent changes in the
economic environment and thus establish a credible perspective for the return to
sounder public finance positions. The Economic Policy Guidelines indicate that in
1995 budgetary policy should aim towards making public finance situations sustainable
again. They also indicate that this means action towards reducing budget deficits to
the reference value indicated in the Treaty on European Union (three per cent of
GDp) Most Member States are still far from this target. The situation in this area
will be reviewed under the "excessive deficit procedure" (art. 104c), which will be
applied for the first time this year, and will need to be addressed in the 1994 Economic
Policy Guidelines.
3.2 Underpinning Medium Term Growth and Employment
Creation
Over the medium-term, the task for policy makers in all Member States must be to act
prudently in order to ensure that the conditions are created which will permit the
achievement of strong, employment-creating, growth over the medium to longer-term.
These conditions involve, above all, the maintenance of a stable macro-economlc
framework which reduces the uncertainties affecting the decisions of economic agents
and helps to reduce real long term interest rates.
The outlook presented earlier suggests that there appears to be a reasonable chance of
achieving arate of growth of about three per cent by 1996. This rate will be slightly
above the Community's potential rate
of growth, but this need not give cause
for concern since a substantial degree
of slack has opened uP during the
current recession. But from the
following year onwards,
notwithstanding the possibility of using
some of the slack created during the
current recession, the Community's rate
of growth will be constrained by the pace of growth of its productive potential.
Economic policy must therefore, as indicated in the White Paper and in the Guidelines,
aim to improve it.
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Recent wage trends are also encouraging in this respect. Since real wages are likely
to stagnate in 1994 while productivity is expected to pick up somewhat (an increase of
about one and a half per cent) real unit labour cost reductions will provide a positive
contribution to investment profitability. Eleven of the l2 Member States are forecast
to show declines or stagnation with regard to real unit labour costs with Greece
forecast to be the exception by showing an increase of 314 of a percentage point.
According to the latest available forecast, these trends are expected to continue in
1995 and to result in a trend close to the rule of thumb suggested in the White Paper
(real wage increases per head equal to productivity increases minus one point).
The main contribution budgetary policy can make to an improvement in medium term
prospects consists in the return to positive rates of public saving as a way of increasing
national saving. Again this objective figures prominently in the Economic Policy
Guidelines. Trends in this area cannot be assessed yet, as the effects of budgetary
consolidation will show clearly in the actual budget figures only when the recovery is
fully under way. However, as already noted in the previous section, the information
available suggests that not enough is being done in the direction of setting in place
credible medium-term consolidation strategies.
Progress towards a more competitive Community economy is also taking place As
noted in section one significant steps are being taken by the Member States and
important developments are under way at the Community level. In the light of the
White Paper proposals presented by the Commission, the Brussels European Council
of December 1993 adopted a short- and medium-term action plan consisting of :
. a framework for Member States' actions;
. accompanying measures at Community level; and
. a monitoring procedure.
The plan calls for action at the level of the Community, the Member states and the
individual enterprises. To monitor the implementation of the plan, the European
Community, each year beginning in December 1994, will take stock of the results of
the action plan and will take any measures deemed necessary to put the plan back on
track. The Commission will present an interim report to the European Council at
Corfu in June 1994. An intensive work programme for the follow-up of the action
plan and the White Paper during the first half of 1994 has been established and similar
arrangements will be necessary during the next presidencies.
(7)
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Conclusions
The conflict between the stability objective, on the one hand, and budgetary and wage
behaviour, on the other, which has been a feature of recent years appears to be
becoming less acute. The unbalanced policy mix which has resulted from this conflict
bears a large responsibility for the slow growth of l99l-92 and for the recession of
1993. Significant progress has been made in the course of 1993 and in the first
months of 1994 in bringing about wage trends compatible both with price stability and
with a situation of rising unemployment. Inflationary pressures also appear to be
abating. Progress towards reducing budget deficits, however, is less clear cut with
practically all Member States taking active steps to consolidate budgetary positions,
but with actual progress being hampered by the weakness of economic activity.
The progress which has been made in the course of 1993 and in the first few months of
1994 has allowed a substantial rebalancing of the policy mix with interest rates
declining substantially. Notwithstanding the reductions which have taken place,
however, short term interest rates remain too high for a period of recession.
The most recent available information suggests that a modest recovery could take hold
soon. In all likelihood it will be led by a modest pick up in exports to the rest of the
world, where economic conditions are significantly better than in the Community, and
by a revival of investment. It would help if European exporters directed their
attention increasingly towards the emerging dynamic economies where additional
export opportunities clearly exist. Private consumption is expected to recover at a
later stage once growth will be strong enough to halt the rise in unemployment. The
pattern of the expected recovery (investment growing faster than consumption),
disappointing as it may be in terms of the rapidity of the turn around, will help the
sustainability of growth and bodes well for the return of the Community's economy ro
rates of growth of more than 2 per cent next year and more than 3 per cent in 1996.
Current trends raise the hope that the recovery will go hand in hand with a resumption
of the nominal convergence process. Baning unloreseen circumstances, the target of
a rate of inflation between 2 and 3 per cent by 1996 appears realistic for the
Community as a whole and for a majority of Member States. Achieving the objective
of bringing budget deficits towards the 3 per cent mark by 1996197, on the other hand,
appears to require additional efforts which will have to be implemented in line with the
return to more robust rates of growth. These efforts are necessary to ensure a
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balanced policy mix and to open the way to a prolonged period of growth thus
reducing unemployment from 1996 onwards.
Past experience suggests that the return to higher rates of growth will imply a
resumption of the process of real convergence. In the past, the catching up countries
have almost always benefited more than proportionally from general improvements in
economic conditions throughout the Community. Furthermore, in the years ahead the
efforts of these countries will be supplemented by interventions by the Community's
structural funds much larger, in nominal and real terms, than at any time in the past.
A substantial reduction in unemployment requires that growth remains both strong and
employment creating for many years. This calls for determined structural adjustment
efficrts and a careful macroeconomic management.
Structural adjustment must aim at making the labour market more effective and at
modifying various aspects of the "employment systems" so as to make growth more
employment creating. Again the White Paper constitutes a very useful basis for
actions in this area. In particular, active labour market policies are necessary to make
sure that the current cyclical increase in unemployment does not consolidate into
structural unemployment. Improved training possibilities must maintain, and possibly
increase, the skills of those who are either losing their jobs or run the risk of being in
this situation.
Structural policies must also aim at making the Community economy more competitive
and more dynamic. The White Paper "Growth, Competitiveness and Employment"
has indicated a series ofactions necessary to achieve this goal.
o Member States, who are competent for most of the necessary actions, should act
without hesitation. In particular they should pay attention not to reduce their
efforts once growth becomes strong again. Good economic periods may make
structural reform appear less urgent, but they are also the periods when reform is
easiest to implement and is likely to bear fruit in the shortest time. Action while
economic conditions remain difiicult and unemployment continues to increase is
more difiicult, but in certain cases it can contribute significantly to improving
economic agents expectations and may therefore be necessary. In any case, it is
important to impress on economic agents that action will be taken, even if only
when grofih willbe stronger.
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o The Community must implement rapidly the actions defined in the Action Plan
agreed at the European Council meeting of December 1993. The Trans-
European Networks assume a particular importance in this respect.
The actions which aim at making the Community economy more dynamic and more
competitive will tend to accelerate the rate of increase in the productivity of those in
work. This makes it all the more urgent to take actions to bring into the labour
market those who are now excluded, encourage job creation in the sectors which offer
the greatest employment potential (local services, leisure, culture, environment, etc.)
and to ensure that the rate of growth of the economy remains strong.
Macroeconomic policy will have to aim at making sure that:
i) strong investment activity leads to an increase in the stock of capital and thus
contributes to increasing the Community's potential rate of growth, this calls for
an additional improvement in investment profitability to be obtained, to a large
extent, through real wage increases.falling short of productivity increases.
ii) national saving rises at least in line with the increase in the share of investment in
GDP; this requires substantial improvements in public saving which should lead to
budget deficits being reduced, in the long term, to less than one per cent of GDP.
iiD in the medium term, actual output growth does not significantly exceed the
potential rate of growth, which would make growth unsustainable (the errors of
1988-89 should not be repeated); the weight of any stabilisation that may become
necessary must be borne by budgetary policy.
iv) the policy mix becomes, and remains, balanced with monetary policy oriented
towards the maintenance of price stability while the other instruments support
growth without being incompatible with the former.
Continued implementation of the policies put forward in the White Paper and
recommended in the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines will open up the perspective
not only of achieving the Community's objectives for growth, employment and
unemployment reduction, but also of achieving in most countries a convergence
performance which will allow their transition to stage III of EMU before the end of the
decade.
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BELGIUM
Economic activity stabilised in the second half of 1993
After the good economic performance in the late 1980s, economic activity in Belgium
slowed down in the early 1990s, and has weakened considerably further since the
second half of 1992. Nl major components of domestic private demand and exports fell
in the first half of 1993 and then stabilised in the rest of the year at a low level; as a
result real GDP is expected to have contracted by about l%o/oin 1993. Although the
unemployment rate in Belgium remained below the Community average, it has risen
unintemrptedly from 7.5Yo of the civilian labour force in 1991 to about 9.5Yoin 1993.
Private consumption, which had been the most dynamic component of demand in both
1991 and 1992, contracted in 1993, particularly the demand for consumer durables,
reflecting to a large extent sagging confidence as households' saving rate peaked at a
historically high level. The continuous dbterioration in the labour market situation in the
past two years also had a negative impact on confidence. Enterprise investment declined
in 1993 for the third consecutive year, reflecting slack capacity and unfavourable
economic prospects, together with the completion of major industrial projects in
previous years. Residential constructioq which had performed well in 1992 when it
benefited from lower mortgage rates, also contracted in 1993.
The information available suggests that export volumes of merchandise goods
decreased in 1993. The accumulated deterioration in price-competitiveness registered
since 1990, due both to the effective nominal appreciation of the Belgian franc and to
lack of wage moderation, are the main causes behind the loss in market shares in 1992
and 1993. Available data on the balance of current transactions of the Belgian and
Luxembourg Economic Union (BLEU) in 1993, on a payments basis, point to an
increase in the current surplus, mainly reflecting the rise in the balance on interest
income due to Luxembourg investment funds, and the improvement in the balance on
merchandise trade as imports of goods seem to have declined more sharply than
exports.
Inflation in Belgium - measured by the CPI - is still below the Community average,
although it edged up somewhat in 1993, from 2.4o/o in 1992 to 2.Bo/o, due mainly to
increases in indirect taxes together with the tapering off of the favourable impact of
energy import prices in 1992. Nominal wages in the private sector are estimated to have
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increased by about 4o/o in 1993, reflecting real wage increases of around l0lo, which
were mainly awarded at sector and enterprise levqls. However, real wage increases in
the public sector in 1993 are put at around 4.5oA, which has not helped the process of
fiscal consolidation.
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Worsening
conditions and insufficient
control over social security
spending were the main
factors responsible for the
unsatisfactory budgetary
outcome in L993. The
general government deficit
remained at about the same
level (7o/o of GDP) as in
1992, thereby overshooting
the (revised) convergence
programme target for 1993
of 5.8% of GDP (')
Although some progress was achieved during the year in curbing excessive spending in
several areas of social security, namely on unemployment benefits and health care, the
deviation from the programme targets was essentially caused by the widening deficit in
the social security system.
Until the widening of the ERM intervention margins in August 1993, the hard currency
policy was highly successful in reducing interest rate differentials with the DM across
the maturity spectrum Only briefly in February/Tvlarch 1993, when markets were
worried about budgetary developments, did the negative short-term interest rate
differential with the DM turn positive. However, in the period last year between August
and mid-November (roughly coinciding with the preparation of the Global Plan), and
despite the unwavering commitment of the monetary authorities in support of the BFR
I Ourlog the budgetary control exercise of March/April 1993, the target annual path for the reduction of the
general government dehcit was slightly revised, although compliance with the EMU deficit criterion of 3o/o of
GDP by 1996 remains the ultimate goal. The revised convergence programme defrcit targets for 1994 and
1995 are 4.7o/o and 3.6% of GDP, respectively.
economlc
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parity (2), the culrency remained under severe strain, (its depreciation vis-d-vis its
central parity against the DM at one point reached 6.6%). Since the presentation of the
Global Plan, the BFR has strengthened, re-entering the former narrow margin of 2.25o/o,
while short-tern rates have declined by about 3 percentage points between September
of last year and the beginning of 1994.
Chart 2 . Belgium
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The trough of the economic
cycle was attained in the
first quarter of 1993. Since
the Spring of 1993,
economic activity recovered
at a slow pace, with
economic indicators
improving considerably at
the end of 1993. The main
factors which are expected
to foster economic recovery
in 1994 are the anticipated
upswing in the European
economy and the continuing
easing of monetary policy in Europe. Inflation is expected to rise slightly in 1994,
reflecting further increases in indirect taxes at the beginning of the year. However, and
in the framework of the Global Plan, the impact on wages of higher indirect taxes
through the indexation mechanism will be partially neutralised from 1994 onwards by
the introduction of a new reference index (the "Health index", which excludes from the
cPI a number of products, e.g. tobacco, alcohol products, petrol and diesel).
Fiscal consolidation is paramountfor the credibility of overall economic policy
In the framework of the convergence programme approved in June 1992, Belgium faces
in coming years the major challenge of successfully pursuing the process of fiscal
consolidation initiated in the 1980s. Gven the recession and the prospect of a slow
recovery, the task of redressing the Belgian public finance situation requires a thorough
re-evaluation of policies, in particular in areas such as social security in order to curb
2 B"t*""n August and October, the short-term interest rate differential with the DM (monthly averages) was
wider by between 260 and 340 basis points than before the crisis.
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excessive growth in spending. The action called for in the broad economic policy
guidelines to reduce budget deficits and put the public debt ratio on a sustainable
downward path is especially urgent in the case of Belgium.
On 17 November 1993, the Federal Government introduced a series of important
measures, in a document entitled: "Plan global pour I'emploi, la comp6titivit6 et la
sdcuritd sociale", to pursue and strengthen the fiscal consolidation process. In
particular, the plan proposes measures to balance the social security accounts in the
medium term, thereby seeking to restore full credibitity to the process of fiscal
consolidation and hence to the hard currency policy.
The saving measures included in the Global Plan - aiming to balance the social security
accounts - amount to approxim ately lo/o of GDP in 1994 (about BFR 70 billion), rising
to 1,.3-l.4yo of GDp in 1996 (BFR 110 billion) (3). The bulk of the fiscal consolidation
effort falls on the expenditure side, namely the pledge to cap at l.5oA per year the
growth in real health-care spending between L994 and 1996. This is a very ambitious
goal as health-care spending grew by about 6Yo per year between 1989 and 1992. The
increase in real wages (and pensions) in the public sector might continue to be excessive
in 1994 despite the reduction in public employment.
Another major concern of the Global Plan is the improvement of the competitive
position of enterprises which has deteriorated in recent years. This is to be achieved
through the introduction of a modifred CPI - the "Health index" - for the wage
indexation mechanism and the freezingof real wages in the 1995-96 period (a).
In order to redress the "balance of incentives" towards employment creation, the Global
Plan includes a series of important measures consistent with the approach recommended
in the broad economic policy guidelines in this area. A number of programmes are
introduced which decrease employers' contributions conditional on creating jobs or
implementing work-sharing schemes, the latter in the framework of a "Plan
In April 1993, an important package of hscal saving measwes had already been adopted, the impact of which
was estimated at about 1.5% of GDP (BFR I 14 billion) in a full year.
As regards 1994, the Government only recommends to the social partners that the real wage increases agreed
for that year should instead be used to promote employment. Real wage increases in the private sector in 1994
are estimated at around I 04.
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d'entreprise. (5). The reduction in employers' social security contributions is being
particularly targeted on low paid jobs, the hiring of young unemployed people, and the
first wholly unemployed worker engaged by an independent. In order to guarantee the
budgetary neutrality of these measures, indirect taxes are raised by an estimated
BFR 30 billion (about 0.a% of GDP).
The "Plan d'entreprise" reduces employers'social security contributions by BRF 100 000 per year for each new
(part-time) ernployment "created" through work-sharing.
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DENMARK
Economic slowdown but stable nominal developments
In 1993, the Danish economy witnessed a disappointing rate of economic growth.
While GDP stagnated, unemployment continued rising, reaching a record level at the
end of the year. In contrast, nominal macroeconomic variables performed well. The
inflation rate is among the lowest in the Community (1,5o in December 1993), the
current account balance is recording a solid surplus (approximately 3,5Yo of GDP) and
the public sector deficit, although widening, has not yet reached the levels experienced
in other Community countries. After the temporary weakening in the aftermath of the
exchange market turmoil in July 1993, the exchange rate is now back to the former
ERM narrow band and the short-term interest rate differential vis-d-vis the DM declined
to 130 basis points at the end ofthe year.
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The main factor explaining the
unsatisfactory growth
performance has been weak
domestic demand with, in
particular, protracted weakness
of consumer spending and a
significant decline in private
investment. Moreover. the
growth perlormance was affected
by the external environment. The
currency depreciations of
important trading partners and
the recession in many European
countries led to a contraction of
exports (-5% in 1993). However, the recorded fall in imports was even sharper (-9%)
and so the external side offset part of the impact of the fall in domestic demand on
output.
Unemployment continued rising at an accelerating pace. The unemployment rate, at
l2'no/o (national definition; l0,4oA at the end of 1993 on the harmonized Eurostat
definition), is the highest since the 1930s, and is the biggest challenge facing the Danish
economy. An important cyclical component adds to high structural unemployment - the
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NAIRU is estimated to be around 8-9%. The remarkable disinflation process made
further progress in 1993. Actual inflation is flat and unit labour costs are rising
moderately. However, the gradual improvement in competitiveness which was
experienced in the early 1990s was intemrpted by the first EMS turmoil in September
1992 when important Community partner countries (and Sweden) devalued their
currencies.
Preseming stability and responding to economic downturn
The conduct of economic policies has been determined by the twofold aim o[, firstly,
preserving and strengthening the nominal stability achievements of the past years and,
secondly, of mitigating the effects of the recession on the real economy and on the
labour market.
Monetary policy successfully defended the exchange rate during the exchange market
turmoil in September 1992 by increasing short-term interest rates and thus accepting a
sizeable interest rate differential vis-i-vis the DM. Continued uncertainties on exchange
markets during the first half of 1993 determined the conduct of monetary policy with
the effect that interest rates in Denmark remained undesirably high during a period of
economic recession. The widening of the ERM fluctuation bands loosened the formal
constraint on monetary policy. The authorities allowed a temporary deviation of the
krone from its central rate, but made clear that they would continue their "hard
currency" policy strategy. The krone is now back within the former narrow ERM band.
During the process of kroner strengthening the Danish authorities cautiously lowered
short-term interest rates, and the short-term differential with the DM narrowed
substantially. It has now reached pre-crisis levels. Long-term average bond yields have
steadily declined last year and the differential of the l0-year benchmark bond yield with
the DM has narrowed significantly. More recently, however, bond yields have started to
increase and the long-term interest rate differential with the DM has widened aeain.
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Fiscal policy responded more
actively to the economic
downturn. First, automatic
stabilizers, which react strongly
in Denmark, were allowed to
work fully and, second, a fiscal
package was introduced in 1993
containing both discretionary
fiscal measures and structural
measures mainly designed to
improve labour market
behaviour. The adopted
prograrnme was a reflection and
in full accordance with the
Edinburgh growth initiative. The discretionary measures are equivalent to lr/zYo of
GDP in 1994. They include cuts in marginal ta:< rates, advancing of public investment,
measures to stimulate the housing market and measures to expand education and
retraining progratnmes. The temporary loss of revenue from toc cuts is planned to be
recouped through increases in taxes and social contributions in the period 1995-98.
Therefore, the fiscal stimulus provided in 1994 will fall in subsequent years, thus
allowing the progressive reduction of the budget deficit.
The success of this policy will depend upon the behaviour of the private sector. A
strengthening of private sector confidence in response to programme would indeed lead
to the desired revival of both investment and consumption. For the time being,
confidence indicators and short-term prospects indicate some revival in private sector
activity and economic growth prospects have improved for this year. A recovery in
major trading partner seems equally important to sustain a favourable growth pattern as
the fiscal stimulus can only mitigate the short-fall in demand temporarily.
The main elements of the structural part of the programme concern labour market
measures intended to reduce structural unemployment. Passive and active labour market
measures will seek to ensure that people receive an early job offer in order to prevent
them from being trapped in long-term unemployment, and in cases where no permanent
job has been found the unemployed will have to join public schemes work in order to
receive unemployment benefi ts.
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Active labour market measures will be restructured and improved. The educational
efforts for employed and unemployed will be strengthened. Furthermore, increased
access to leave of absence (of up to one year), for the purpose of further education on
personal reasons will be provided. Additionally, financial incentives for unemployed
persons to become entrepreneurs and more room in the educational system will be
created. All in all these measures should improve labour market flexibility.
The Danish government presented its first convergence programme in February 1994.
The convergence programme describes medium-term growth prospects and the efforts
being made to achieve convergence. The programme is based on the broad guidelines
and the main element is the fiscal package introduced in May 1993. The main goals of
the programme are fiscal consolidation and the reduction of unemployment; in
particular the Danish authorities underline their commitment to meeting the
convergence criteria.
Gven the seriousness of the economic recession in Europe, Danish economic
performance has been relatively favourable. Priority has been given to maintain nominal
stability, while during 1993 the importance of labour market problems have been
recognised and started to be adressed through structural reform. The policy choice of
using fiscal policy as the short term stabilizing instrument is not without risk and
success will depend lrrgely upon a recovery in the rest of the Community.
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FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
The German economy adjusting to unification
In 1993, GDP in the whole of Germany fell by \,2o/o (in West Germany the decline was
I,gyo).In 1994 growth will probably be in a range of 0,5yo to Io/o. At present expansion
in eastern Germany is constrained by the difficult economic situation in the western part
of the country and in the short run there remain uncertainties about the likelihood of a
major self-sustained
recovery. Growh
performance in the
whole of Germany will
be affected by the
short-term effects of
fiscal consolidation and
depressed disposable
income of households,
possibly well into 1995.
However, further
monetary easing will
provide support to the
resumption of growth.
In addition, export performance, which has already recovered during 1993, should
progressively improve together with competitiveness and so should overall growth
dynamism. The major problem in the meantime will be unemployment, already at
4 million in the whole of Germany (more than l0o/o of the labour force according to the
national definition; \Yo onthe harmonized Eurostat definition).
Due to the substantial public transfers to East Germany - currently at some 5% of GDP
per year - a small surplus in the general government balance before unification (1989:
0,1%ofGDP)hasturnedintoasizeabledeficit (2,60Aof GDP in1,992,3,3o/oin 1993).
This figure, however, was approximately half of total borrowing by the public sector in
the broad sense (including the Treuhand and railways). The government reckons that, in
1995, when all these earlier borrowings will have been taken over by the government,
the public debt/GDP ratio according to the Treaty on European Union will be around
the 600/o benchmark.
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Savings measures seem, nevertheless, to be gaining credibility and public borrowing
could be on a declining trend. This improvement of the outlook for governnrenl
borrowing and the expected reduced pressure on prices have allowed the Bundesbank
to gradually, albeit cautiously, ease its monetary policy
Chart 2 - Germany
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The trade surplus, which declined by some DM 100 billion (to DM 50 billion in 1993)
after unification, will remain substantial in 1993 and 1994, but partly because of weak
imports. The positive trade balance does not make up for the traditional deficit in
invisible trade, however, in particular so because the surplus on factor incomes is
expected to dwindle, especially due to net payments of capital income abroad follou,in*
large inflows of capital in the last few years.
Slow recovery in West Germany after deep recession
In 1993, the West German economy seems to have reached the trough o{'tlrc rcrir-'..r,1.rr.
Total output fell2,5o/o below the peak reached in early 1992. Fram the spring ot- 199-l
onwards output and orders began picking up and the second and third quarters saw
modest GDP growth. The improvement was slow, however, and some indicators
pointed to stabilisation at a low level rather than a genuine recovery. In tlr* orilr ... :
1993 business confidence improved but later in the year GDP and induslrial Irroi|irtilrr
contracted again. GDP for the whole of 1993 fell by l,9oh.
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The strongest reduction was in investment; equipment investment fell by as much as
l5%. Total domestic demand was2,6Yo lower than in 1992. Net exports provided some
positive contribution to growth, but only because imports fell even more than exports
(by 9,5Yo and 6,loh respectively) (o). The performance of private consumption was the
surprise as it stabilised at the level of the previous year in spite of a considerable erosion
of households' real disposable incomes (because of job losses, wage moderation and
higher social security contributions and taxes). This relative stability of consumption
was to a large extent supported by a dip in the household saving ratio to l2,3oh, below
the level ofprevious recessions.
The labour market situation has been worsening very rapidly in 1993. Employment has
been falling since it peaked at 29,4 million in September 1992, after several years of
strong growth. At the end of 1993 the unemployment rate (national definition) stood at
8,lolo @urostat: 6,07o). Industrial employment was particularly hard hit. Relatively slow
productivity improvements and high wage rises had caused unit labour costs to rise
steeply relative to competitor countries. Large scale rationalisation is now taking place
in order to restore the competitive position of German industry. More than
500 thousand jobs (net) in manufacturing disappeared in 1993; unemployment will be
one of the major problem areas of the next couple of years.
In early 1994, the German economy faces considerable uncertainty. Some further
output contraction in particular at the beginning of the year cannot be excluded while
the outlook for the rest of 1994 may be more promising. Domestic demand will remain
depressed, especially in the area of private consumption as real disposable household
incomes will deteriorate again although this could possibly be cushioned by a further fall
in the saving ratio. Government consumption is also expected to remain flat (in real
terms) as a result of fiscal consolidation. The downward trend in total capacity
utilisation could bottom out, but investment growth will be modest. The domestic
demand component which should provide a positive contribution to growth seems to be
residential construction, benefiting from the low level of long-term interest rates (and
possibly also from the continuous rise in rents). The possibilities for a recovery driven
by exports seem to have improved in view of a returning to a sounder footing in
inrportant partner countries; export orders rose visibly during 1993, especially towards
6 'l'hcsc tradc data should be regarded with caution. The introduction ofthe new recording system for intra-EC
llos,s at thc bcginning of 1993 may have caused both exports and imports to be underrecorded, but imports to
a g,rcatcr cxtcnt (sce box).
22.3.94
-55-
the end of the year. Therefore West German GDP could expand again in the course of
t994.
Notwithstanding this improving background employment will fall further and
unemployment could rise to more than 9o/o (or more than 7o/o on the Eurostat definition)
of the labour force in the current cycle. Inflation - now mostly driven by services, rents
and fiscal and administrative charges - is easing. Import prices, which were on a
downward trend throughout 1993, are no longer declining. Although this might involve
some inflationary risk, the dampening effect of domestic factors seems much more
important in the current circumstances (e.g. low capacity utilisation and wage claims).
Wages actually reacted to the change in economic climate and wage rises can be
expected to slow further. Moreover, the one-off tax increases should not permanently
affect inflation.
Economic upswing in East Germany driven by public transfers
East Germany's present steady growth performance is still strongly supported by
transfers from the western part of the country. Meanwhile, locally produced output has
sharply declined since unification. Employment has decreased from 9,5 million to
6 million and is expected to fall a little further up to 1995. Unemployment is the result
of the restructuring that is required and reflects generally low productivity and an
overall lack of competitiveness. Although output is now growing again and productivity
performance is improving, output per person employed is still only some 45o/o of the
West German level. At the same time wage costs are already more than two thirds of
those in West Germany, causing unit labour costs to be approximately 50% higher.
Employment in the public sector (roughly half the number of those in public
employment in western Germany compared with less than a quarter of the number of
inhabitants) will have to decrease considerably in the years to come. Future job losses
will, more than in the past, result in open unemployment which is projected to rise up to
1995, albeit at a much lower pace than in the past.
Output is growing in a number of manufacturing sectors, but employment continues
falling in all sectors except construction. A promising sign is the high rate of
investment. For the most part investment is taking place in infrastructure (railways,
telecommunications etc.) and construction, but business investment, especially in the
services sector, is now also strongly picking up, admittedly from a low level. This
should gradually allow for self-sustained overall growth.
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Inflation in East Germany, close to 9Yo in 1993, has been mostly driven by price
increases of services and rents, largely resulting from the gradual deregulation of
administered prices (rents, transportation, energy). Producer prices rose by a little less
than lYo in 1993 and are not expected to accelerate in 1994. Inflation is expected to
converge gradually to the West German rate.
Economic policyfocuses onfiscal consolidation and structural reform
In early 1994, the German economy seems at a cross-roads and policy makers are
facing serious dilemmas. Fiscal consolidation is imperative for regaining confidence and
long-term credibility, as emphasised in the broad economic policy guidelines. Measures
to this end are now being implemented, but their inevitable contractionary effect in the
short term comes at an unfortunate time in the cycle. As to monetary policy, a further
reduction of short-term interest rates seems desirable for domestic purposes and
feasible in the light of the reduced risk of inflation. The rise in consumer prices, in early
1994 a little more than3Yo, is coming down and the "underlying" rate of inflation is by
any measure already very close to the Bundesbank's O-2o/o objective. The downward
pressure on inflation is further illustrated by producer prices which have remained
practically unchanged for more than a year. Against this background, the renewed
acceleration of M3 growth at the end of 1993 and early in 1994, seems surprising. It
was, however, strongly influenced by special factors.
In November 1993 the German authorities presented their updated convergence
programme, setting out government measures for enhancing the German convergence
effort and improving medium-term growth prospects. Most of these measures form part
ol'two major fiscal packages introduced in 1993: the Federal Consolidation Programme
and the Programme for Savings, Consolidation and Growth.
l'he Federal Consolidation Programme was adopted in Spring 1993. It settles, first, the
allocation of the debt related to unification rvhich has so far been dealt with off-budget.
In 1995, allunification-related items will entirely be accounted for in the budget and the
rc-introduction of the "solidarity" tax surcharge (worth some 1o% of GDP) is envisaged.
.l'hc 
second major issue settled in the Federal Consolidation Programme concerns the
incorporation of the new Liinder into the regular fiscal framework of the Federal
l{cpublic from 1995. The reshaped revenue sharing system will provide for additional
lirnds to flow from the western Linder and the Bund to the East German states.
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The Savings, Consolidation and Growh Programme was adopted in late 1993. It
marked a shift in government policies in that it emphasised spending cuts, rather than
revenue rises, in order to help to achieve the fiscal targets for 1994 and beyond.
Envisaged savings amount to some DM 25 billion in lgg4, rising to more than
DM 30 billion in 1995. They concern mainly unemployment benefits, but also salaries in
the public sector, subsidies, socialbenefits and family allowances.
Despite unsatisfactory developments in M3, a continuation of the Bundesbank's policy
of cautious cuts in interest rates is expected by markets, in the context of subsiding
inflationary pressures and the prospects of further declining inflation rates. The timing
of monetary policy moves might depend on the perficrmance of the DM on exchange
markets. However, some downward correction in the DM's effective nominal external
value should be seen as a return to normal rather than as a matter of concern.
With respect to structural issues the German authorities have put much stress on the
need for greater flexibility on the supply side and the improvement of economic
structures. In September 1993 they presented their views and policies in a policy report
on Germany's future attractiveness as a business location (?). Among the points dealt
with figured greater flexibility in the labour market and of working-hour regulations, an
opening up of the liberal professions and improved functioning of product markets (e.g.
energy). In order tc improve the international competitiveness of German banks the
Bundesbank reduced the minimum reserve requirements substantially (becoming
effective in March of 1993 and 1994).
Brurdesminister ftir Wirtschaft.
Deutschland, September I 993
Bericht der Bundesregienrng zur Zukunftssichcmng dcs Stanckrrlcs
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GREECE
Stabilization efforts andweak demand improve inflation and external position
Greece experienced a slowdown in economic activity in 1993, with output estimated to
have remained approximately flat. Official estimates suggest that the level of domestic
demand was broadly unchanged in 1993 compared to the previous year. A rise in
private consumption was offset by a fall in investment particularly in public investment
as a result of a DR 230 billion cut in the public investment budget. The weak economy
has had adverse consequences for budgetary consolidation and, as a result, prospects
for nominal convergence have been set back. However, inflation and the external
accounts showed improvement.
The labour market has gradually deteriorated. Employment remained flat, although
employment in manufacturing has declined. Wage growth decelerated further in 1993-
Incomes in the whole economy have risen by lZ.loh, the combined result of the public
sector incomes policy and the private sector wage agreement negotiated in May.
However, real disposable income declined by 0.a%.
Greece's external accounts improved slightly in 1993, with the current account deficit
representing 3.5Yo of GDP compared to 4.4oh of GDP in 1992 This improvement is
due partly to the decline in domestic demand which led to a fall in imports and partly to
higher Community transfers. The trade deficit stabilised in absolute terms and the
external sector made a positive contribution to GDP in 1993.
Greece made progress in bringing the inflation rate down from 19.5o/o on average in
l99l and 15.9oAin 1992 to 14.4o/o in 1993, according to CPI data. The gains made on
inflation are mainly due to the slowdown of the economy and to the decline in real
incomes, especially in the public sector, which have affected demand. However, the
decline in inflation has been modest, due to the continuing depreciation of the drachma,
to the overshooting of the targets of the monetary programme which has increased
liquidity above planned growth, and to apparent inflation expectations associated with
continuing fi scal imbalances.
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The nominal effective
depreciation of the drachma
in 1993 was 9.6% against
20 industrial countries'
currencies and 6.90/o against
other Community currencies,
compared to 7.7oA and 8.4o/o
respectively in 1992. There
was a serious overshooting
of monetary targets in 1993:
M3 grew at a rate above
15% compared with the
target band of 9-l2YoE.
Publicfinances severely hit by economic slowdown
The most important development in 1993 was the overun in the fiscal deficit. The
central government net borrowing requirement (excluding capitalised interest) rose to
l4,2oh of GDP, about 6Yo of GDP above the planned deficit. This overrun was
principally due to a large shortfall in budget revenues and to a small ovem:n in
expenditure.
Factors underlying the fiscal imbalances in 1993 were the decline in economic activity,
the reform of the personal and corporate tax code (Law 2065/92) which failed to realise
the projected rise in tax declarations and the widening of the tax base, continuing tax
evasion (especially in VAT following the abolition of customs controls), and increased
primary expenditures in the approach to the October elections.
The financial position of the wider public sector also deteriorated in 1993. Thc
deterioration was particularly pronounced in the area of public enterprises, while the net
borrowing target for public entities (social security organisations) has been respected.
Credit to the public sector is expected to havc increased by some l2%o as comparcd with thc targct rangc ol
5%oto1Yo.
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The debt of the central government at the end of 1993 is estimated at DR 23 278 billion
or 138.8% of GDPe. Because of the very large public debt financing needs marginal
interest rates on government borrowing remained high throughout the year: interest
rates on one-year Treasury bills passed from 22.5Yo in December 1992 to 20.5o/o in
l)ecember 1993. Deflated by the CPI inflation rate, real interest rates for the l2-month
Treasury bill have stayed relatively high, at 8.4%oin December 1993. Interest payments
in the ordinary budget amounted to 13.60/o of GDP in 1993, up from 10 sya of GDP in
1992.
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The prospects for 1994 are not
bright. In the real economy,
domestic and foreign demand
could contribute to modest
output growth in 1994, the
former through an increase in
infrastructure constructlon
activity, and the latter through
the recovery ofinternational and
of the European economy.
Private consumption could also
slightly increase. The increasing
borrowing needs of the public
sector will inhibit the decline in
interest rates, thus slowing a recovery in private investment. Incomes policy announced
early this year projects an increase in the wages in the central government of 7.80% over
the year, at a lower level than the expected inflation rate; however, it is not yet clear
rvhether nominal wage arrangements in the private sector will be in line with inflation
perspectives. On the other hand, social security contributions increased by 2.75% in
January. Consequently, real wages and real disposable incomes are expected to
clccrease, in the public sector, continuing the trend observed since 1991.
'l'his cstimatc includes debt owed to the Bank of Greece which has not previously been included in official
(ircck dcbt figures and is not yet included in the general govcrnment debt ligures in Part A ofthis report.
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Fiscal adjustment: a necessary but not sulficient condition towards convergence
The macroeconomic outlook for 1994 and beyond is dominated by fiscal prospects. In
order to establish the conditions for output recovery and real incomes growth, real
interest rates must decline from the persistently high levels of the past three years. In
turn, the key condition for this is the decline in the risk premium on government
borrowing which is associated with the continuing fiscal imbalances. Furthermore, a
determined fiscal correction would not only foster expectations that future budgetary
imbalances will be contained, thus dispelling prospects for high levels of future taxation
and encouraging private investment, but also, the portfolio crowding out observed
during recent quarters would be reduced, making room for an increased level of private
investment to be financed by domestic saving.
In the framework of the broad economic policy guidelines adopted by the Council in
December 1993, all the efforts of macroeconomic policy will have to concentrate on the
correction of fiscal imbalances. The challenge for Greece's economic policy, starting in
1994, will be to prevent further deterioration and resume the process of public deficit
reduction. Gven the size of current fiscal problems, the efforts will have to be pursued
over several years in order to put Greece's public debt position in a sustainable position.
A determined budget deficit and public debt reduction is the necessary condition for
substantial interest rates reduction, price stabiliy and exchange rate stabilisation, and
thus, for real and nominal colwergence as provided by the Union Treaty.
However, if fiscal adjustment is necessary for Greece to start moving towards
convergence, it is not a sufificient condition. Policies aimed at reforming the institutional
setting and the restructuring of the economy will be necessary if the full potential of the
Greek economy is to be realised. Among the changes required will be the improvement
of the quality of services offered to business and households by the wider public sector,
through increased competitition and privatisation, and the reform of business factor
costs to improve the competitiveness of the economy and the trade balance through
increased export activity and substitution of domestically produced goods for imports.
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SPAIN
Economic acfivity bottomed out in mid 1993 but prospects arefor a slow recovery
In the past two years Spain was hit by its deepest recession of the last few decades.
GDP dectined for four quarters in a row between the third quarter of 1992 and the
second quafter of 1993. According to provisional data, GDP reached a trough in the
second quarter of 1993, but it rose (quarter-on-quarter) at only a very mild pace in the
third quarter.
The 1992-93 recession in Spain and the current low level of economic activity are
similar to those in most other European countries. Investment, which slumped from a
growth rate of 6.90/o in 1990 to a sharply negative figure in 1993, has accounted for
most of the weaker trend in domestic demand and GDP. Private consumption has been
weakening very markedly since the second half of 1992 and also recorded a negative
figure in 1993, an unusual feature in Spain. The peseta depreciation and the very
depressed domestic demand led to a substantial improvement in the external accounts in
t993.
Short-term prospects are for a gradual shift from external demand to domestic demand
growth. Domestic demand has probably begun to rise early in 1994, while the positive
contribution from the external sector is expected to weaken, particularly due to the rise
in imports stemming from the recovery in domestic demand.
In 1993, the peseta depreciated approximately 13% against the DM. The g%
devaluation of the currency in May and the widening of ERM bands in August, by
relaxing the exchange rate constraint, provided greater leeway for a reduction in official
interest rates. Following the devaluatiorq the Bank of Spain lowered its key intervention
rate in a series of steps from 13% to 9Yo on 3 December, the lowest level since 1977.
This drop, which was mirrored in both short-term and long-term nominal rates, was the
main factor behind the considerable drop in inflation-adjusted short-and long-term rates
during the same period. By the end of the yeaq the latter recorded values of 3.8yo and
2.9oA, respectively. The continued reduction in interest rates after the widening of ERM
bands in August has, however, been compatible with a stable peseta exchange rate.
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Wage increases compounded recessionary trends and partly offset the impact of the
peseta devaluations
The three devaluations of the peseta between September 1992 and May 1993 allowed
for significant gains in competitiveness in 1993, making room for a positive contribution
of the external sector to GDP growth which softened significantly the extent of the
recession. The poor working of the labour market has however hindered the possibility
to take full advantage of these competitive gains. Despite the severe fall in economic
activity and the shaqp rise in unemployment, wages have not adjusted to the situation on
the labour market and continued to grow in real terms.
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As a consequence of the
poor working of the labour
market and of rigid wage
behaviour, companies have
reacted to lower demand
through strong cuts in
employment. This
aggravated the already high
level of unemployment. The
rise in unemployment has in
turn contributed to job
insecurity among a large
share of the work force and
has played a role in the
general loss of confidence among consumers. This partly explains the deepness of the
recession and has contributed to delaying a recovery in private consumption and,
indirectly, in investment.
Moderate progress on inflation, sharp deterioration in public accounts
The cyclical downturn has had a dampening impact on inflation. Despite the increases in
indirect taxation, the depreciation of the peseta and continued stickiness in services
prices, inflation decelerated significantly in the second half of 1992 and in early 1993.
However since then, while price increases for non-tradeables have slowed down
significantly, less progress in tradeable goods and sharp increases in non-processed food
in particular intemrpted the disinflation process, leading to an average CpI inflation rate
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of 4.60A in 1993. Progress in inflation cannot be taken for granted to continue in 1994.
The delayed impact of the peseta depreciation on domestic prices together with the
expected recovery in demand can push prices up further. Moreover, if insufficient wage
moderation persists, price expectations would worsen.
The figures for the budget deficit show a sharp ovemrn in 1993. After a general
governmentdeficit of 5.0Yo of GDPin 1991,4.60/oin1992and atarget of 3.60/ofor
1993, as included in the budget law, the official estimate for 1993 is now put at 7.2o/o of
GDP (chart 2). Three major factors explain the very pronounced deficit overrun of
1993. First, the downswing in economic activity was sharper than expected (the
cumulated GDP outturn for 1992 and 1993 is -O.I% against an expected growh of
4.3o/oin the two budget laws). Second, there were some revenue lags and losses related
to the removal of customs on 1 January 1993. Third, a less important factor was a
regularisation of non-recognised debts originated in the preceding years which also had
some impact on the 1993 deficit.
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These deficits have sharply
pushed up public debt
which reached 55.6% of
GDP at the end of 1993.
Stabilisation of the debt
ratio has become more
difiicult as this now
requires a positive primary
balance, whereas the latter
has become increasingly
negative in recent years
Ta c kl i n g u ne mploy ment through structural reform
Spain has continuously experienced, for more than a decade, the highest unemployment
rates among the Community countries largely as a consequence of a malfunctioning
labour market. To deal with the problem, the Spanish government approved last
Dccember a wide ranging package of structural reforms, in line with the convergence
programme and with the recent broad guidelines for economic policy.
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The package comprises two draft laws and a decree-law. The first draft law reforms the
workers' statutes @statuto de los trabajadores). It intends to ease regulations on
working hours, firing requirements and job mobility (geographical and functional). The
second draft law authorizes temporary placement agencies. Finally, the decree-law on
urgent measures to foster employment legalizes private job agencies, sets new hiring
procedures with new contracts for apprentices, part-time and temporary replacement
work, and extends the time-span of temporary contracts coming to its term next year.
These reforms can be seen as entailing sweeping changes which aim at reducing
rigidities in the labour market and fostering the responsiveness of real wages to the
economic situation. In the short term, this higher flexibility may have a perverse effect
on unemployment, with a related budgetary cost. However, in the medium term, it is
expected to improve competitiveness, encourage investment and foster employment
creation.
Budgetary redress hinges upon economic recovery andfiscal discipline
In the very unfavourable context described above, the targets of the convergence
programme presented in April 1992had to be set aside, especially those regarding fiscal
consolidation (deficit of lYo of GDP by 1996). The Spanish authorities are currently
revising the medium-term path of fiscal consolidation to make it more realistic.
The 1994 target for the general government deficit has been set at 6.40/o of GDP
(0.8 points lower than in 1993) while the draft budget for 1994 aims at reducing the
central government deficit to 5.7o/o of GDP, i.e., 0.5 percentage points below the 1993
estimated outturn. The reduction in the central government deficit is to come mainly
from expenditure cuts, both on public consumption and social transfers. In particular,
the wage bill has been frozen, unemployment benefits have been reduced and pensions
are to be increased at the rate ofexpected inflation, instead ofbeing based on past price
increases. The deficit target could, however, turn out to be optimistic unless a
significant recovery in economic activity occurs. In dealing with the budget deficit,
there is a need for greater control in public expenditure.
Another fundamental problem concerns the medium-term development of the deficit.
Two aspects call for special attention. One relates to the extent of the welfare system.
Though Spain still lacks the degree of social protection of other developed countries,
social expenditure has grown very substantially since the early 1980s. As a
consequence, the tax burden has also risen markedly. Trimming the budget deficit may
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require a re-evaluation of social expenditure in the light of the country's financing
capacity and of a more selective access to social benefits'
A second important issue relates to the relationships between the different layers of
general government. The decentralisation process has implied some overlapping of
activities between the central goverrrment and the regional and local authorities.
Moreover, the central government can only influence budgetary developments at the
lower levels of public administration indirectly. After several years of budget overruns,
a sounder stance now appears to be prevailing at the level of the Autonomous
Communities, but in contrast the local authorities seem to face new difficulties. Further
improvements in the co-ordination between the different layers of public administration
would contribute to better control and effrciency of public finance.
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FRANCE
Slowly coming out of the recession
For the first time since 1975 French GDP declined in 1993 (by 0.7%). After a sharp fall
at the end of l992,French output shrunk further in the first quarter of 1993, dragged
down by the weakness of domestic demand. Since then, some signs of slight
improvement are appearing. The French economy has been reacting more sensitively to
the cyclical downturn in the Community than during previous recessions.
A marked fall in foreign demand affected exports. While in 1992 exports still
contributed significantly to economic growth" they fell in 1993. Some loss in
competitiveness at the end of 1992 relative to some European main partner countries
were compensated only in the second half of 1993 by the improvement of
competitiveness vis-a-vis non-European countries. Even a decline in export prices in
manufacturing industry, reducing profit margins on export markets, did not prevent this
unsatisfactory performance. More generally, the consequences of the depreciation of
some important trading partners from September 1992 interrupted momentarily the
period of improving competitiveness through a low rate o.f inflation which resulted in
large market share gains in 1992.
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The external performance did
not fail to have its effects on
the domestic economy. After
the September 1992 exchange
market turmoil confidence
indicators dropped sharPlY and
the threat ofa severe recession
became apparent. Moreover,
still high interest rates further
subdued domestic economic
activity, discouraging
borrowing and therefore
Private consumPtion and
investment. The easing of
monetary policy in Europe in the course of 1993 and the retreat of speculative pressures
in the EMS after the substantial widening of the ERM fluctuation bands in August'
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contributed to some improvement of the French economic environment in the second
half of the year.
Investment was particularly hard hit, following the strong increase in corporate
investment in the second half of the 1980s. Its decline, some 30olo in industry over the
period l99l-1993, could reduce the growth rate of potential output in manufacturing.
As a consequence of the drop in confidence and a deteriorating labour market
performance, consumers reduced their spending in particular on consumer durables.
The saving ratio increased sharply at the end of 1992 and declined only moderately
during 1993 as confidence improved slightly. The growth in disposable income was
restrained by wage moderation in the private sector. However, large social transfers and
rising wages in the public sector prevented real disposable income from falling. Without
the positive contribution of public expenditure, households' consumption would have
been even weaker.
Weak economic growth had its impact on the labour market. The labour market
situation has continuously worsened since early 1991. Unemployment was at a record
level at the end of 1993 (3.3 million people, or a rate of 11,2o/o on the harmonized
Eurostat definition) and continues to rise. The recession mainly explains this trend, but
structural factors have contributed to the unsatisfactory development. For example, the
youth unemployment rate amounted to about 23%o. Given modest growth prospects a
reduction in unemployment cannot be expected during 1994.
The inflation performance improved again in 1993. Inflation has been kept under
control by moderate wage development and particularly by imported stability as a result
of the French exchange rate policy. Consumer prices increased by about 2o/o and the rise
would have been even smaller in the absence of the increase in indirect taxation.
However, in manufacturing industry, unit labour costs continued rising because of a
marked slowdown in productivity growth. With increased price competition on
domestic and foreign markets profit margins in French manufacturing industry were
reduced substantially as a result of the fall in production and export prices.
The trade balance recorded a surplus in 1993 (about FF 90 billion), mainly resulting
from declining imports and an improvement in the terms of trade. It is doubtful if the
recorded surplus in the trade balance can be maintained once the domestic recovery
gains momentum and imports start to rise again. However, while exports declined in
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1993, competitiveness of French industry remains quite good and exports should benefit
from a general recovery in foreign markets.
Endogenous growth prospects remain uncertain in the short term. Given the slow
growth profile likely in some important partner countries, €.9. Germany, a strong
export-led upswing cannot be expected. Capacity utilisation remains low and the profit
situation is not supporting capital-widening investment. Rising unemployment might
prevent a strong fall in the saving ratio even if monetary policy continues along its path
of cautious easing. In addition, fiscal policy is now aiming at medium-term
consolidation and might have less supporting effects on demand in the short term.
Domestic demand is therefore likely to remain subdued in the first part of this year, but
may recover gradually in the second half.
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increase in interest charges (by l2%). The budget deficit would have been even larger if
privatisation proceeds had not been allocated to finance budgetary expenditures,
particularly current outlays. Financial receipts collected during the previous
privatisation programme (1986-1988) were mainly devoted (two-thirds) to debt
consolidation.
The financial equilibrium of the French social security system (regime general)
deteriorated in 1993 as a result of cyclical and structural factors. The latter have their
origin especially in the progressive ageing of the French population which is affecting
pension expenditure, and also health expenditure. A set of short-term (health insurance)
The slowdown in French
economic activity has led to a
major deterioration of the
State budget deficit from
l,9oh of GDP in 1991 to
4,4o/o in 1993, with a primary
deficit exceeding lo/o of GDP.
The loss in fiscal receipts and
also increasing public
expenditures aiming at
supporting economic activity
have widened borrowing
needs. The rising public debt
resulted in a very sharp
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and long-term (pension scheme) measures were adopted in order to consolidate
expenditure. Moreover, larger fiscal resources were allocated to limit the social security
deficit: the CSG (contribution sociale gen6ralis6e) was increased from \,lo/o to 2,4yo,
corresponding to about FF 25 billion in 1993 and tax on fuels was raised too. As a
result of these measures, the social security deficit which amounted to
FF 57 billion in 1993 will probably decline to close to FF 40 billion in 1994. Taking into
account unemployment insurance and local authorities'financial imbalances, the French
general government net borrowing was about 5%% of GDP in 1993 according to the
most recent official estimate. Therefore, together with the measures that have already
been taken, a clear upward swing in economic activity will be necessary to start to
restore sound French public finances. This is the aim of the French convergence
programme adopted in November 1993, which provides a medium-term strategy for
achieving budgetary consolidation in France during the second stage of EMU.
French economic policy has been primarily concerned with maintaining a large degree
of nominal stability while attempting to mitigate the economic slowdown. Monetary
policy has been devoted to preserving the DM-FF exchange rate. After temporary
tensions on the exchange markets during which French short-term interest rates were
increased markedly, the widening of the ERM bands in August 1993 enlarged the room
for manoeuwe of monetary policy. As confidence in the FF strengthened, nominal
interest rates were lowered sharply. Nevertheless real interest rates are still high in view
of the sluggishness of the economy, indicating a cautious approach towards monetary
easing. Against the background of these cautious interest rate reductions, in late 1993
the FF was back within the former narrow band.
Given the priority of the exchange rate objective, the Banque de France's monetary
target (an increase of 4-60/o in M3) was considerably undershot in 1993: by the end of
the year, the aggregate was in effect showing no increase. Part of the undershooting can
be attributed to "technical factors" such as the issue of the Balladur bond and portfolio
shifts in general but it must also be related to the weakness of nominal GDp in France
and to interest rates relatively high given that weakness. For 1994, the Banque de
France has only slightly modified its targeting procedures: the importance of M3 has in
practice been somewhat downgraded (medium-term target of 5o/o a year instead of an
annual target range) and total domestic credit has been introduced as a "privileged
indicator". The government retains the authority to decide on the exchange-rate r6gime
and the franc-DM link will continue to be of major importance for monetary policy
dccisions
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Adoption of a medium-term strategt of fiscal consolidation
Fiscal policy has been used as the cyclical stabilizing instrument during the recession.
The automatic stabilizers were allowed to work to the full extent and discretionary
measures were also taken to stimulate the economy. The effects of previously adopted
cuts in taxation and weak domestic demand squeezed tax revenues. Gven the
significant deterioration of the public sector deficit, there now exists little scope for
continuing this process.
In order to strengthen fiscal credibility, the French authorities have adopted a medium-
term strategy of fiscal consolidation which is embodied in the convergence programme.
The planned restoration of healthy public finances in France is in line with the European
Council's broad economic policy guidelines for 1994, aiming at improving conditions
for growth. The convergence programme aims at a reduction of the general government
deficit to below 3o/o of GDP in 1997 mainly through expenditure restraint and a reform
of the social security sector. Budgetary expenditure should not increase in real terms
implying that the consolidation target (a reduction by a half percentage point of GDP in
each of the coming years) might prove a quite ambitious challenge.
The success ofthis consolidation strategy will crucially depend upon a revival of private
sector-led growth as fiscal policy will change from a supportive to a restrictive stance.
A favourable external demand environment and a significant improvement in private
sector confidence seem to be the main preconditions for a favourable growth scenario.
The contribution of monetary policy would consist in a continuation and perhaps
acceleration of easing in order to compensate for the shift in fiscal policy.
Wage developments will have to continue to contribute to both re-establishing external
competitiveness and improving profit margins. However, in order to influence private
sector expectations positively wage moderation should be accompanied by greater
flexibility in particular as regards the possibilities to employ low productivity workers.
As suggested in the broad guidelines' recommendations on the reduction of indirect
labour costs and on policies in favour of employment, structural policies in 1993 were
principally devoted to removing rigidities in the labour market and corporate sector.
Cuts in social security charges on low-skilled workers and other measures increasing
flexibility of working time were adopted. Employment is hampered by the still high level
of labour costs in the case of unskilled workers resulting from the existing rules on
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minimum wage (SMC). The French government has opted for progressively reducing
employers' social security contributions on low wages. This measure is part of a
recently adopted medium term law in favour of employment. Other rigidities will be
removed by improving vocational training (particularly apprenticeships) and flexibility in
the organisation of work. In this perspective, settlements on working time on a yearly
basis will be encouraged. A recovery of employment is all the more necessary also with
respect to consolidation of public expenditure. In 1993 large amounts of budgetary
resources have been allocated to support the labour market, particularly in the form of
subsidised part-time jobs in the public sector, at a budgetary cost of FF 15 billion'
Moreover, structural reform has been enhanced by the start of a large Programme of
privatisation which has been well received by financial markets which see scope for an
improvement in the efficiency of the enterprises to be privatised.
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IRELAND
The January devaluation required a cautious macroeconomic policy stance
A firm macroeconomic
policy stance was needed in
Ireland in 1993 to
strengthen credibility in the
wake of the devaluation of
the pound in January.
Hence, fiscal policy
remained firmly focused on
maintaining control over the
budget deficit. While the
January 1993 budget did
project a mild deterioration
in the deficit to about 3t/zYo
of GDP, this implied a fiscal
tightening given the impact of the slowing economy on thg public finances. Monetary
policy remained similarly oriented towards stability with cuts in the Central Bank's
short-term facility (STF) being determined by falls in market interest rates and the
stability of the pound within the ERM.
This policy stance - complemented by the strengthening of sterling - successfully re-
assured financial markets of the continued stability orientation of economic policy.
Following the l0% devaluation of the currency's ERM central rate on 30January the
pound stabilised quickly within its new ERM bands. The Central Bank of Ireland
reintroduced the short-term facility (STF) rate at 13.75% which subsequently was
reduced in a series of steps toTo/o, the lowest level since the introduction of the facility
in 1979. From September the Irish pound appreciated steadily (mirroring sterling) and
by end year was the strongest currency in the ERM grid. Furthermore, the eventual
outturn for the budget deficit, at just over 2Yo of GDP, was substantially lower than
market expectations and the official forecast.
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Moderate output growth, low inflation but continued very high unemployment
Given the constraints presented by the policy stance outlined above, growth in output
continued at a respectable pace in 1993, particularly compared with the falls in output
in most Member States. Nonetheless, the estimated outturn of around 2olo represents a
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sharp slowdown on the
corresponding figure of
almost 5% achieved in
1992. This slowdown was
largely due to the sharp
deceleration in the growth
in the volume of exports.
The other components of
demand failed to fully
offset this slowdown.
Private consumpuon
remained relatively weak
despite continued strong
growth in real disposable income owing to fears of unemployment and the carry-over
of high interest rates from 1992.Private investment was similarly affected by interest
rates and only a major boost to the public capital programme prevented a sharp fall in
total investment. Finally, public consumption was constrained by the need to keep the
budget deficit in check.
The expected acceleration in inflation following the January devaluation failed to
materialise - a trend seen in several other Member States whose currencies also
devalued. The private consumption deflator is now expected to have risen by only
about 2o/o compared to a forecast range of 3o/o to 4Yo. Several factors underlie this
better than expected performance. Firstly, Ireland's effective exchange rate did not
depreciate signficantly relative to its pre-ERM crisis level, owing to even more
substantial devaluations in several other Member States. Secondly, substantial stocks
had been accumulated when the pound was strong which combined with strong retail
competition restrained price increases. Thirdly, pay rises for 1993 had already been
decided under the existing agreement on incomes policy. Fourthly, exchange rate
(post-devaluation) and commodity price developments were favourable. Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, the firm stance of macroeconomic policy and the slowdown
in growth restrained inflationary pressures.
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Superficially, labour developments suggest that some progress was achieved in 1993.
The average annual level of unemployment in 1993, as measured by the live register,
emerged at about 294 OO0 compared to a budget estimate of 309 000. However, while
data is still scarce, this lower than anticipated level is probably attributable to an
upsurge in emigration, changes in eligibility conditions for unemployment benefits and
an increase in training programmes rather than strong employment growth. Moreover,
at around 18% of the civilian labour fiorce this still represents an unacceptable level of
unemployment and emphasises the enormity of the challenge facing policy makers in the
years ahead when labour force growth can be expected to continue at about 2o/o
annually.
Impressive nominal stability needs to be complemented by accelerated structural
reform
The challenge facing the Irish authorities in 1994 is to build on the strengths and room
for manoeuwe created by the success on the nominal front and to turn the focus of
policy more strongly towards unemployment. A number of policy considerations will
crucially determine their success or failure in meeting this challenge.
\
There are clearly deep structural rigidities underlying both the current level of
unemployment in Ireland and the failure of the strong output growth of recent years to
be translated into suffrciently increased employment. The government-commissioned
"Culliton Report" performed a valuable service in identi$ing these rigidities and
higilighting the need for their urgent reform. The government are continuing the
necessary programme of reforms. It is essential that this programme is speedily and
effectively implemented. The commitment to follow the "general guidelines" on
Community economic policy agreed by the EcoFin Council in December should assist
this process.
Reform of the taxation system has a crucial role to play in tackling the structural
rigidities currently preventing a better employment perFormance. The continuing fiscal
consolidation of recent years has been achieved partly at the cost of a rise in the burden
of direct taxes. This burden impacts heavily on lower paid workers and is widely
credited with having major disincentive effects on labour supply. The improved fiscal
position in Ireland now presents an opportunity to intensify the necessary tax reforms
The recent budget has made some further progress in this respect and the commitmcnt
to further reforms in future budgets is welcome.
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Ireland has followed a centralised pay bargaining system over the past six 
years which
has made a valuable contribution towards consolidating economic and 
social stability'
However, future wage developments should afford a higher priority to employment 
and
competitiveness. Real wage growth in Ireland over the period of the two previous
agreements has been substantially above the Community average' The economy's 
job
creation needs would be better served by more moderate pay developments, 
particularly
in the public sector where wage growth has been strongest' In this respect there has
also been recent encouraging progress with the government and social partners 
agreeing
to moderate pay rises for the period from 1994 to 1996'
Investment growth in Ireland has been relatively stagnant in recent years' Encouraging 
a
higher level of private investment is a priority. consideration also needs to be given to
the scope for switching public spending towards increased public investment which has
borne the brunt of spending cuts over the past decade. The investment opportunities
presented by the substantially increased structural and cohesion funds must also be
efficiently exploited.
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ITALY
Recession continued in 1993 despite large contribution of real net exports to GDP
growth
The recession starting in mid-1992 continued throughout most of 1993 and at the end
of the year no definite signs of cyclical upturn had yet appeared. After the prolonged
slowdown in growth from 4. lo/o in 1 98 8 to 0 .9oh in 1992, real GDP declined in I 993 by
around 0.5olo according to latest estimates. The recession would have been much deeper
but for the contribution of real net exports, which partially offset the persisting fall in
domestic demand. While economic activity may have bottomed out by the end of 1993,
expectations are for only a slow recovery in 1994 (1.6% GDP growth, according to
official figures), with momentum gaining in the second half of the year.
The fall in domestic demand, initially resulting from an unusually sharp decline in fixed
investment, deepened because of a significant reduction in private consumption (-l 8%
on average in 1993), a behaviour never recorded in previous post-war recessions.
Consumers' expenditure has been heavily affected by the decline of disposable income,
which was due to the fall in total employment, the reduction in real per capita
compensation and the increase in the tax burden. At the same time, the contraction in
total investment that preceded the recession at the beginning of 1992 intensified in the
first part of 1993. Fixed investment is estimated to have fallen by more than 8% in real
terms on average in 1993.
Chart t.ltaly
Current account balance
(1it.000 billions)
40
20
0
.20
.40
lEstimates of Comrnission SeMces
Source: Eankol
gt 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93r
The response of the Italian
trade balance to the
devaluation of the lira after
the departure from the
ERM in September 1992
has been extremely rapid
and positive. Since then, the
depreciation of the lira
significantly exceeded the
losses in contpetitiveness
recorded in the previous
three years. In nominal
effective terms the average
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depreciation of the Italian culrency in 1993 was around 20o/o in comparison with the
pre-crisis level. Notwithstanding the deterioration in terms of trade, the nominal trade
balance did not show any pervefse J-curve effect, whereby a real depreciation of the
exchange rate worsens a balance-of-trade deficit initially, only to improve it over t'ime.
By contrast, the trade balance moved into positive figures in the first months of 1993
and strongly improved in the remainder of the year. Preliminary estimates on volumes
indicate that in 1993 average imports fell by between 8 and 10olo, while exports
increased by the same rate.
Cyclical impact on labour demand compounded by severe restructuring in
manufacturing and semices sectors
While employment in Italy was traditionally characterized by low responsiveness to
output fluctuations, the current recession has heavily affected labour market conditions.
A number of institutional reforms introduced in the last ten years substantially reduced
private labour market rigidities, but alsb fiscal constraints have recently prevented the
public sector from playing a role of employment stabilizer. The cyclical impact on
labour demand has been compounded by severe restructuring involving first the
manufacturing sector and then the private services sector. In 1993, employment losses
are estimated to have been over 600 000, of which almost a half were in services and a
third in manufacturing. The unemployment rate, according to the national definition,
rose from 9.4o/oto ll.3%between January and October 1993 and reflected, once again,
substantial differences in the regional distribution of unemployment, with a rate of
lS.g% in the South, g.SYointhe Centre and 6.9Yo in the North.
Inflationary impact of devaluation dampened by falling demand and wage
ntoderation
The large depreciation of the lira has only slackened, but not halted the progress in
disinflation. In 1993 the average rise in consumer prices was 4.2Yo, which is below the
offrcial target for inflation (4.5%) and represents the lowest rate in twenty-five years.
Falling domestic demand and structural factors contributed to contain domestic
int'lationary pressures. However, behind these results has also been wage moderation,
essentially due to the institutional changes introduced between 1992 and 1993 in the
wage formation mechanism, which substantially removed the risk of a wage-price spiral.
'l'5e reform of the wage setting mechanism started in 1991 and completed in July 1993
5as greatly changed industrial relations and reinforced incomes policy as a decisive
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instrument to curb inflation. The rules for wage settlements have been completely
reshaped. the economic
effects of the contracts
bargained at national level
have to be consistent with
the target inflation rate;
firm-level wage increases
will be rigorously linked to
productivity gains and
improvements in
competitiveness. The new
regime constrains the wage
evolution to the disinflation
path set in the goverment
targets, and replaces the
previous indexation mechanism. Since mid-I992, the rate of growth of per capita wages
has been outpaced by the inflation rate: The rebound in measured productivity, obtained
through reduction in employment, helped to reduce unit labour costs, which fell by
0.5 percentage points in the first three quarters of 1993.
Progress in fiscal consolidation in spite of the recession
-79 -
lnflation
There has been a very
significant adjustment effort
in the public finances in the
last two years. The budget
for 1993 was a landmark,
both in the size of the
planned correction relative
to underlying trends (close
to an estimated 6% of
GDP) and in the willingness
to tackle structural fiscal
problems. Reforms were
introduced in the fields of
public employment,
pensions, health care and local authority finances. These efforts were to some extent
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overshadowed by the recession which hampered the pursuit of fiscal adjustment and
increased its cost. Nevertheless, an improvement of the order of lYo of GDP was
achieved in the primary budget surplus in the state sector account in relation to 1992.
At the same time, the exchange rate regime followed since the departure of the lira from
the ERM allowed a steep fall in interest rates (from a peak of 15o/o in September 7992
to below 7.5o/o at the end of 1993 for the net yield on 3-month Treasury bills) and thus
helped contain the total deficit relatively close to its targets. Although interest rates are
expected to remain low, the persistence of a risk premium vis-i-vis other EU countries
points to the need to hasten deficit reduction and to the danger that significant slippages
from the deficit targets might reverse the declining trend of interest rates. The progress
achieved so far in fiscal consolidation must therefore be continued in 1994 and beyond.
Last year also marked a turning point in privatization; the long-awaited process of
dismantling the large state involvement in the economy has started to achieve some
concrete results. The strategy pursued privileges the objective of swift and irreversible
privatizations rather than maximization of proceeds from the sales. Total revenues from
the sale of public enterprises are estimated at some 5oh of GDP, but a significant
proportion will be needed for restructuring operations, thus the direct impact on public
debt is going to be very small.
Prospects for convergence reinforced by structural reforms
Economic policy in the last two years correctly adressed the major structural problems
of the Italian economy. The implementation of these reforms will allow the convergence
process of the Italian economy to rest on a more solid foundation. Fiscal consolidation
should be continued vigorously, as recornmended in the broad policy guidelines, so that
the stabilization and subsequent decline in the debt to GDP ratio is achieved soon. The
inflation differential from the three best-performing Member States, currently at
2.5 percentage points, must be narrowed. Although the large output gap along with
wage moderation has helped contain the inflationary pressures arising from the currency
depreciation, the hoped-for recovery will require the anti-inflationary commitment to be
built in a context of exchange rate stability. A scenario of healthy recovery in economic
growth and employment, along with steady progress towards convergence, includes
income and monetary policies to control inflation and a budgetary policy to achieve
fiscal consolidation. This policy mix will help to ensure exchange rate stability.
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LUXEMBOURG
Growth supported by internal demand
Over the last decade, Luxembourg has consistently accomplished a better economic
performance than most other European countries. The estimated growth for 1993 of
around 3l4Yo continues to compare favourably with the other Member States. The
improving external environment should permit GDP to increase by approxim ately Zo/o in
real terms in 1994, still considerably less than the average growth rate of around 4o/o in
the period 1983-92.
The relative resistance of the Luxembourg economy to the European recession in 1993
is a consequence of the strength of domestic demand. An increase in private investment
of 5.5o/o representedtheprincipal contributiontogrowthin 1993. Thisfigureismainly
the result of a big state-supported renovation program in the steel sector and the
launching of a new Astra telecommunications satellite; public gross capital formation
receded. Private consumption rose by about lYo and was sustained by wage increases
higher than in the neighbouring countries, driven by close-to-full employment in the
labour market. Because the expansion of employment in t\e services sector more than
compensated for the continued decrease in the traditional steel sector, total employment
continued to rise, albeit at a slower pace than in the previous years. Since the number of
foreign workers is increasing faster than the creation of additional employment,
domestic unemployment has risen a little to around 2.5Yo (Eurostat definition), although
it still remains by far the lowest in the Community.
In contrast to most other Member States, inflation is not declining in Luxembourg, but
remains lower than the European average. The relatively high real wage growth,
combined with higher excise duties and increases in costs for medical care and other
administered prices are responsible for this evolution.
As a result of the strong internal demand combined with weak external demand, the
merchandise trade deficit widened in 1993. As usual, this was compensated by a surplus
on the services balance and by a net inflow of factor income, creating a healthy surplus
on the current account.
If the improvement of the economic situation in the neighbouring countries is confirmcd
tn1994, the negative groMh contribution from external trade could be eliminateci 'l'hc
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level of domestic demand will be sustained by the increase of private consumption, due
to a relatively high real wage growth, and of public consumption, investment is likely to
fall back a little, because of the completion of some major investment projects. As a
result gross domestic product could grow by 2%o in real terms. Without major indirect
tax increases in 1994, inflation might fall back to just over 3.ZYo.
Public finance situation remains healthy
Afterthe reform of the tax system in 1991, which included a reduction of direct taxes
only partly compensated by higher indirect taxes, the government accounts are no
longer in surplus. The rapid increases of public expenditures, especially on health and
pensions, further weakened the public finance position. Still, Luxembourg continues to
comply with the EMU convergence criteria on public debt and deficit.
To prevent a further deterioration of the public deficit, the government has reduced the
budget norm from 3.5oh to I .5%. This norm gives the admissible real increase in central
government expenditures (social security excluded), based on medium-term growth
prospects. In combination with the expected increase in wages, as generated by the
automatic wage indexation system, this results in the allowed nominal increase of
central government expenditures. The application of this norm still results in an
expected growth of nominal expenditures of the central government (social security
included) of 6.9Yo,which implies a real increase of more than3Yo. The reduction of this
growth rate is proving to be very difficult since the major part of spending is rigid and
regulated (wages, previous engagements of the central government in the social security
system). Still, the government should try to revise some of these automatic expenditure
mechanisms to prevent a worsening of the still healthy public finance situation.
Central government revenue is estimated to increase by 6.80/o in 1994, with similar
contributions from direct and indirect taxation. A major part of the higher indirect tax
receipts is explained by the increased proportion of the common receipts of the
economic union between Belgium and Luxembourg. The part for Luxembourg is to be
increased from 12.8% to 15.7o/o.
ln the social security sector, the further implementation of the reform of the health
insurance system, which was initiated in 1992,limits the state's contribution to 39o/o of
total revenues of the system. This was necessary to prevent a further fiscalisation of the
system. As a consequence of this reform, it might be necessary to increase private social
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security contributions. Health expenditures will be limited by negotiating a fixed budget
for each hospital. Together with the improving economic environment, which generates
higher ta:< receipts, these measures could lead to a small reduction of government
borrowing in 1994.
-84-
NETHERLANDS
Deep recession avoided but recovery will be slow
In contrast to most other countries in continental Europe, the Netherlands were able to
Chrrt 1 - Netherlaods
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avoid a marked recession in
1993 and real gross
domestic product probably
remained about equal to the
year before. This apparent
resistance of the Dutch
economy to the deeP
recession in Germany is
remarkable, considering the
openness ofthe country and
the close economic and
monetary integration with
Germany.
Private consumption has been the main contributor to growth in 1993. After a small dip
in the first quarter, caused by anticipatory purchases of durable goods in the last quarter
of 1992 in advance of higher indirect taxes, consumption recovered promptly and grew
by approximately lo/o over the year. This can partly be explained by higher than
expected real wages because inflation was over-estimated when the long-term wage
contracts were negotiated. However, the strong consumer spending mainly originated
from lower saving, possibly caused by low long-term interest rates.
For the first time in l0years, real gross capital formation was lower (by some 35%)
than in the previous year, as a result of lower capacity utilisation and weak order
positions. While government investment, non-subsidised residential construction and
investment in equipment were stable or still showed some progress, non-residential
construction and investment in transport equipment (especially trucks) receded sharply.
The small share of the hard-hit manufacturing sector in Dutch GDP (only 17.8o/o of
value added in l99Z) also helped to shelter the Dutch economy from a deeper
recession. The automotive sector, which was probably most affected in the current
recession, is almost absent in the Netherlands. The Dutch specialisation in agricultural
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products and their derivatives, which are less sensitive to cyclical variations, further
helped to isolate the Netherlands from the recession in its neighbouring countries.
This specialisation pattern also allowed Dutch exports to remain relatively unaffected by
the fall in demand from the major trading partners. This was realised at the cost of a
strong decline in profitability in the exporting sector. Import volumes were about loZ
lower than the year before (ro) reflecting the decline of investment. The combination of
steady exports and falling imports led to a current account surplus of around 2Yo of
GDP.
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Unemployment, which had
been constantly abating since
1984, rose sharply from
6.80/o in 1992 to 8.2o/o in
1993 (Eurostat definition).
Compared to other countries
such as France and
Germany, it took a long time
in the Netherlands before
unemployment started rising
in response to the lower
growth. A first exPlanation
for this phenomenon is that
the economic downturn in
the Netherlands started later and was more moderate than in most other countries. The
sudden increase in unemployment also points to earlier labour hoarding, caused by the
institutional framework in the Netherlands. Indeed, the costs of the rigorous legal
procedures that have to be followed to lay off employees postpone necessary labour
market corrections. Finally, because of the recent changes to the disability scheme,
which were aimed at reducing the number of hidden unemployed in this scheme, more
people registered as unemployed than before.
l0 As in other EC countries, there are considerable uncertainties about the development of intra-llC traclc durirtg
1993 following the abolition of internal customs frontiers and the introdtrction of thc ncw lN-flinsTn'l'
recording system. See box on "Reliability of intra-EC trade statistics in 1993".
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The activity slowdown, combined with the strength of the Dutch guilder, has brought
down inflation from a peak of 4.4Yo at the beginning of 1992 to an average of 2)Yo in
1993. A cut in the highest VAT rate by one percentage point to 17 .soh at the end of
1992 andthe recent wage moderation also contributed to lower inflation.
The credibility of the peg of the Dutch guilder to the German mark never came
seriously under pressure despite the economic downtum and the turmoil in the ERM.
Under a bilateral agreement with Germany, the Netherlands even maintained the pre-
August 1993 fluctuation margin of 2.25o/o, while the other currencies moved to a l5olo
band. The continued strength of the Dutch guilder, leading towards the end of 1993 to
an appreciation of 0.67o above its DM parity, permitted the monetary authorities to
regularly cut interest rates independently of the Bundesbank. This produced a negative
short-term interest rate differential with the DM for most of the year under review,
reaching a maximum of -100 basis points on 3-month euro-deposits in June; after the
August events in the exchange markets the differential widened again to -60 basis points
in December.
Despite the relatively good performance in 1993, the recovery in 1994 will be slow and
growth will probably be below l%. Both consumers' and producers' confidence
indicators have bottomed out in the second half of 1993, but remain at low levels and
no clear upswing is in sight. Domestic components of GDP will remain very subdued
while the specialisation pattern of Dutch exports will not allow full advantage to be
taken of a possible economic recovery in the rest of Europe.
Growth expected for 1994 will be insufficient to create additional employment, so the
unemployment rate will continue to rise to more than 9%. This will put additional
pressure on social partners to limit wage increases in their negotiations. Inflation will
benefit from lower wage settlements, but higher excise duties and government-regulated
gas prices will broadly offset this.
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Fiscal consolidation continued in 1993, but some easing in 1994
Despite the lower than expected economic growth in 1993, the central government
deficit has been reduced to 3.60/o of Net National Income(rl), slightly below the target
set in the coalition agreement of October 1989. This was achieved because additional
measures were taken in Spring 1993 and was also due to higher than expected revenues
amounting to 0.7o/o of GDP which occurred in the final part of the year.
In the original budget for 1994, the government decided not to compensate for
expected lower tax receipts, caused by the adverse economic environment, to avoid
possible deflationary effects of further budget cuts or tax increases. The budget
objective was relaxed from 3.25% of NM to 3.9o/o of NNI. Nevertheless, to arrive at
this result, real expenditures have to be reduced, excise duties raised and part of the
expected proceeds of the privatisation of the state-owned telecommunications company
will be used. The most important structural expenditure cut comes from freezing the
level of government salaries and social security benefits. When it became clear that
revenues in 1993 were considerably higher than expected, the government decided in
February 1994 to use these budgetary opportunities to improve employment through a
reduction of the collective burden of taxes and social premium payments, starting from
July 1994 and getting to its full extent in 1995 when the package will amount to
approximately IYo of GDP. Part of the additional revenues is used to reduce the central
government deficit to 3.75o/o of NNI in 1994, but no further improvement is envisaged
before 1997.
While the original target for 1994 in the convergence programme of March 1992 was
set at 2.4o/o of GDP, the government now expects a deficit of 3.6Yo of GDP. Although
the difiicult economic circumstances explain part of this loosening of the target and it
still remains one of the lowest deficits in the Community, the effort to reach the 3 -0o/o
EMU objective before 1997 should be continued; this is especially important for the
evolution of government debt, which continues to increase slowly from its present level
of 8l% of GDP.
ll. The oflicial Dutch deficit objective is the deficit including financial transactions, based on caslt rcccipts'
expressed as a percentage of Net National lncome (NM). This dehcit was 4.3Vo in 1992, cornparcd to a
deficit of 3.5% of GDP using the EMU defrcit concept.
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Government takes measures to promote employment
In its 1994 budget, the government proposes a three-pronged offensive to create jobs
and strengthen the economy, in line with the recommendations of the broad economic
policy guidelines. Firstly, a new infrastructure improvement programme up till 1998
was announced. These additional public investments will be financed by part of the
privatisation proceeds and windfall gas revenues. Secondly, the government is urging
the social partners to moderate wages. A freeze of nominal wages for 1994 is already
accepted by the trade unions in the public sector; employers and trade unions in the
private sector agreed to limit wage increases, after a government threat to impose a
global nominal wage freeze. The government also intends to give the possibility to
employers to hire people at wages below the minimum agreed for the sector, but still
above the national minimum. Finally, the government announced a number of measures
to promote job creation. A fiscal incentive for research and development expenditures
will be introduced and the wealth tal( on enterprises will be reduced. Furthermore, the
basic income ta,x deduction for job-related expenses will be raised. This increase of the
income gap between employed and unemployed should provide a greater incentive for
people on social benefits to return to the job market. The additional fiscal package of
February 1994 also lowered non-wage labour costs for employers and reduced taxes for
small and medium sized enterprises.
Although these measures will have some beneficial effects on employment, they will not
be sufficient to stop the rise in unemployment in the short term. Additional structural
measures in the social security system will be necessary, to create an appropriate
incentive structure to increase labour market participation. Some far-reaching reform
proposals have been made by a parliamentary commission last year, and rneasures along
these lines should be part of the agenda for the next government after the upcoming
national elections.
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Reliability of intra-EC trade statistics in 1993
Because of teething problems of the new INTRASTAT system, which records trade data within the
European Community, current figures are still preliminary and probably not very reliable. After the
realisation of the Single Market in January 1993, customs-based data were no longer available. As a
consequence, a new system was introduced relying on data from both importers and exporters. There is
no aouUt" that the introduction ofthis new system has entailed distortion in the time series; intra trade
flows are underestimated in both directions. The distortion occurred in a period of recession and
subdued trade; it is difficult to isolate reasonably the statistical effect of the change of the statistical
system from the slowdown of the underlying trends in trade.
It seems that in most Member States the distorting problems observed are of a more transitional nature.
INTRASTAT figures for the months following the first quarter of 1993 are showing a certain return to
normal. Nevertheless one may not exclude that, for the time being, there are still factors which tend to
lower the level of statistical results. Eurostat and Member States have sta(ed detailed analyses in order
to assess the quality of INTRASTAT data and to cope better with possible distortions due to the new
statistical system.
Intra-Communitv trade. values. O1/1992-0211993 (billion ECU)
Arrivals
Dispatches
Difference
Qrlez Q2le2 Q3t92
185.1 183.0 166.5
181.4 178.2 161.9
3.1 4.9 4.6
Q4192 Q1/93 Q2le3
182.0 159.9 161.2
t76.0
6.0
t66.7
6.8
166. I
4.9
Ql-2-34192 have not been adjusted for re'exports
Source.. EUROSTAT, provisional, based on data provided by Member States, for some Member Statcs,
estimates have been made. Arrivals are CIF, dispatches FOB.
The problem can be illustrated by comparing Dutch and German bilateral trade data. Following thc
most recent Dutch data (until July 1993), Dutch export value to Germany remained flat compared with
the previous year. However, German offrcial sources show that in the first six months Gcrman imports
from the Netherlands were 25o/o lower than the year before'
Contrary to INTRASTAT, the Community figures referring to the period before 1993 dot not covcr, for
example, re€xports to other Member States of goods imported from third countries and releascd for
free circulation in the Member States of re+xport. Such flows are of great importancc espccially in thc
case of the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany. This distortion in the "customs figurcs" has bccn
overcome in the new system; thus a meaningful comparison of INTRASTAT data with data of prcvious
years requires adjustments.
The above could imply that provisional estimates for net exports, and therefore GDP growth in 1993,
as presented in this report, are too favourable.
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PORTUGAL
Sharp deceleration of economic activity in 1993 accompanied by progress with
disinflafion
In line with developments elsewhere in the European Community, economic activity in
Portugal was characterized in 1993 by a contraction in GDP, led by a substantial
deceleration of internal demand. Continuing the prolonged slowdown of economic
growth since 1990 (4.4% in 1990, 2.lo/o inl99l and 1.lo/o inl992) real GDP is
estimated to have declined by around 0.5Yolastyear. As a result of the cyclical position
of the economy and some difiiculties in the process of tax collection, the general
government deficit recorded a sharp increase in 1993, well above the budget forecast.
Inflation declined further, a development to which the weakness of the economy has
also contributed. Furtherrnore the situation in the labour market eased considerably and
nominal wages recorded a large deceleration.
The evolution of GDP in 1993 was marked by developments on domestic demand. In
particular private consumption by residents recorded a sharp slowdown to a rate of
l.SVo as gains in real wages were much smaller than in the previous years and
unemployment increased. The weakness of economic activity, compounded with the
decline in profit margins and the level of real interest rates, contributed to a decrease in
total gross fixed capital formation and, particularly, of investment by private sector
enterprises.
Since 1992 the employment situation (close to full employment in the previous years)
has been deteriorating, a trend that was reinforced last year, due to not only cyclical
factors but also the ample process of industrial restructuring which is taking place in
both the private and the public sectors. With some delay to the marked easing in labour
market conditions, wages in 1993 have displayed an impressive deceleration in both
nominal (from around l5Yo to 8%) and real terms (from 4%o/o to lY,%). To a large
extent these developments suggest that the Portuguese economy continues to enjoy a
substantial degree of real wage flexibility, which should prove to be an important
advantage in efforts to achieve simultaneously real and nominal convergence.
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In 1993 inflation was
significantly reduced. The
rate of increase of
consumer prices fell from
9.5oh in 1992 to 6.8% last
year, mainly as a result of
the weakness of economic
activity and the pronounced
slowdown of internal
demand. The deceleration
of wages certainly also
played a role. These factors
seem to have more than
offset so far the impact on
inflation of the depreciation of the escudo following the upheavals in the EMS since the
surnmer of 1992. The escudo has lost about lToh vis-it-vis the ECU, but the real
depreciation of the escudo vis-d-vis the other Member States has remained limited to
about one half of the nominal depreciation, allowing an improvement in Portugal's
competitive position.
Public finances were severely hit in 1993. In the presence of much weaker than
expected economic activtty the authorities allowed the automatic stabilizers to work
instead of adhering to the targeted budget deficit (4.2% of GDP, down ftom 5.2o/oin
1992).In addition, the revenue shortfall problem seems to have been compounded by
an increase in VAT avoidance following the abolition of customs controls on imports
from other Community countries, together with the surfacing of structural problems in
the overall tax collection process. As a result of all these factors, and despite some
success in controlling non-social security expenditure the budget deficit turned out to be
around 8% of GDP.
The gradual recovery from recession of the European economies which now secms
likely will certainly have an important impact on a small open economy like Portugal.
The marked increase in public (and also private) investment co-financed by the
Community Structural Funds will also play a positive role. Furthermore and assuming a
non-accommodating exchange rate policy, continuation of disinflation is likely although
at a gentler pace than in recent years. On the domestic side the main doubt regarding
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economic recovery in the current year seems to concern the behaviour of private
consumption, in a context of increasing unemployment and sluggish wage growth'
The neecl to consolidate the public finances and the revised convergence progriln nxe
Achieving further progress in convergence remains the main challenge for Portugal'
This means continuing to pursue stability while securing a growth rate above
Community partners, in line with the broad economic policy guidelines. However,
convergence is taking place in the context of a process of deep structural adjustment.
Chart 2 - Portugal
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The envisaged path towards
convergence is displayed in
the revised Portuguese
convergence programme
(tee4-1ee7). Public
finances are to be brought
back to the convergence
track with the budget deficit
declining steadily from
1995 onwards; for 1994 an
accommodative fiscal
stance will be lollowed (the
budget deficit is targeted at
about 7%) given the
prospects of only a mild recovery. Achieving the medium-term public finance targets set
in the revised convergence programme will require a rigorous implementation of the
fiscal consolidation strategy. A significant reduction of public finance imbalances is not
only necessary for the purpose of allowing Portugal to respect the criteria set for
participation in EMU. It is also decisive to achieve, in a sustained way, both real and
nominal convergence.
Disinflation is to be based on a non-accommodating exchange rate policy aiming at a
stable escudo vis-i-vis the main ERM countries. Domestic wage developments should
support this approach, which is in line with the Community broad guidelines for wage
moderation. In this vein, nominal wage increases in the public sector in 1994 are
expected to be in the 0-3Yo range while in the private sector a similar development will
rnost likely occur.
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The Portuguese economy has been subject to ample structural changes in particular
since accession to the Community in 1986. This process is leading to a reduction in the
size of the agricultural sector, a restructuring of industry both in the public and private
sectors, the liberalization and modernization of the financial system and the contraction
of the importance of the public sector in the economy. Notable changes are taking place
in industry. The latter has benefited from the emergence and development of new
sectors (e.g. transport equipment, electrical goods), led by foreign direct investment and
whith a dynamism which contrasts with the rest of industry. The traditional export
activities, based on labour-intensive technologies, have been losing importance and
should continue to face difficult challenges in the future. As for the remaining economic
sectors, industry is adjusting in Portugal to an economic environment in which
exchange rate stability is the prevailing rule.
The inflow of Structural funds foreseen for the 1994-99 period will be a major support
to the ongoing process of structural adjustment. The Community support framework
will be used primarily to improve the long-run global competitiveness of the economy
through investment in physical (including infrastructures) and human capital. Upgrading
the qualifications of the labour force, through professional training and education,
would allow a smoother adjustment process. Further reform of the labour market,
namely the promotion of a higher degree of regional labour mobility, which requires the
development of an effective housing market in Portugal, would certainly prove
beneficial.
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UNITED KINGDOM
A developing uPswing
By the end of 1993 the recovery in the united Kingdom was well established, following
a recession that had been sharper and earlier than in the rest of the community'
Beginning in mid 1992 theupturn, particularly for non oil GDP, was at first slow and
uncertain but during the course of 1993 there were some signs that the pace of growth
was accelerating; the year-on-year growth rate rose from l'4o/o in the first quarter of
1gg3 to 2.6%inthe 4th quarter. Non-oil GDP growth has been somewhat weaker than
overall growth through the year but it too accelerated towards the end of the year' At
the same time inflation remained subdued, so that the economy entered 1994 with a
growth rate close to its trend rate with inflationary pressures seeming dormant'
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The upswing has been led
by domestic demand and in
particular bY Private
consumption which bY the
4th quarter of 1993 was
growing at an annual rate of
over 3%. ConsumPtion
growth largelY resulted
from a fall in the saving
ratio. Having declined to
historically low levels
during the preceding boom
in 1988-90, the household
saving ratio was restored
during the recession and reached an above average level of 13% by mid-I992' From
early 1993 the saving ratio began to fall and by the 3rd quarter was2YzYo points down
from its peak. Consumption growth was also helped by a somewhat better employment
performance than expected although rather less so by developments in real personal
clisposable income which has remained broadly unchanged since end 1992. Gross fixed
capital formation has yet to make a significant contribution to the growth of domestic
derrrand.
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Exports have also been contributing to the upswing. Trade data in 1993 have been
erratic and uncertainties have increased with the changed recording system resulting
from the implementation of the single market from I January 1993 (see box). The
overall picture would appear to be one of modest export and import growth. From the
3rd quarter of 1992 to the 3rd quarter of 1993 exports grew by around 3Yo in volume
while import growth was just over 2o/o. Sharp recorded differences in trade
developments with the Community and non-Community areas reflect partly the
recession in Europe, in contrast to growth elsewhere, and partly statistical disturbances
caused by the changed recording system.
Inflation remains more subdued than expected particularly in the light of the
devaluation of sterling subsequent to its exit from the ERM. The headline index for
consumer prices fell to an annual rate of l,ZYo in June 1993, the lowest level since
1964. Subsequently it rose to 2,5o/o in January 1994. The underlying rate, i.e.
excluding the impact of interest rate changes on mortgage payments, remains under
3olo representing the best UK inflation performance in two decades. Behind this good
inflation performance lies a continued fall in the growth rate of average earnings and
wage settlements leading to falling unit labour costs, intense competition at the retail
sales level as well as the cautious relaxation of monetary policy. As a result of the fall
in unit labour costs and the lower level of sterling, compared to the previous year, the
competitiveness of the UK improved sharply.
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A feature of the UK economy
in 1993 was a turnaround in
unemployment which was
both earlier and sharPer than
expected. From its peak in
January 1993 unemploYment
had fallen by over 200 000 bY
the end of the year with the
unemployment rate down
from 10.60lo to 9.9o/o (10.3%
on the harmonized Eurostat
definition). Employment rose
marginally in the second
quarter and more stronglY in
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the third quarter.
The UK enters 1994 with better short-term prospects than most of the other Member
States; continued growth in output is expected with inflation remaining under control.
On the other hand the UK also faces uncertainty concerning the sources of future
growth. The recovery in 1993 has been substantially based on domestic, and in
particular, consumer demand which has expanded largely through a reduction in the
household saving rate. This has occurred despite the overhang of financial imbalances
associated with the previous inflationary upswing. While the personal sector debt
problems have been significantly reduced on a flow basis (i.e. the interest costs of debt
have fallen very substantially) the stock of debt remains close to its historically high
levels. This increases the sensitivity of the personal sector to monetary policy - though
this will be modified by the recent shift towards fixed rate mortgages - but it could
also be expected to have some impact on saving behaviour. Hence the question is
whether the continuing large stock of debt, assuming house price increases remain
modest, will not put a floor on the fall in the savings rate. This combined with the
weight of tax increases and possibly a fall in real personal disposable income would
suggest that the outlook for consumption growth would be subdued and that sustaining
the recovery in the UK may well require that exports and investment contribute
increasingly to growth.
The prospects for export growth are enhanced by the expected turnaround in the
European economy and by continued growth in America and Asia (Japan excepted).
However, the rather full pass through of price rises (in domestic currency terms) on
exports following the devaluation of sterling and the subsequent, partial, reversal of
the depreciation could be moderating influences. The fall in investment has flattened
out in 1993 largely due, however, to a significant rise in public sector investment;
private sector investment continued to fall through to the second quarter of 1993.
While investment continues to be a lagging variable, the prospects for future growth in
private investment will depend on a continuation of the expansion of internal and
external demand. Overall the UK should continue to grow faster than the other large
Member State economies in 1994.
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Measures taken to improve the fiscal outlook
As the recession deepened and remained prolonged the UK fiscal position deteriorated.
Measurement of the impact of the cycle on deficits can only be approximate but it is
clear that prolonged and sizeable deficits, whatever their initial source, eventually
become increasingly structural in nature and increasingly difficult to reverse. In the
case of the UK four years of increasing deficits had brought a degree of intractability
to the UK fiscal position (as was illustrated in the UK convergence programme,
presented to the EcolFin Council in July 1993, which foresaw general government
deficits remaining above 3o/o of GDP to beyond 199'll8 unless a rapid growth rate of
3Yzo/o was achieved). In the event the two budgets of 1993 (tv{arch and November)
between them improved considerably the medium-term fiscal outlook, with the general
government deficit now expected to reach the Maastricht 30lo reference value by the
financial yeu 1996/7.
The fwo budgets were
notable for tax increases
pre-announced to apply in
later years, thus not directlY
impinging on the fragility
of the recovery, particularly
in the early part of 1993.
The overall impact of the
discretionary changes in the
budgets was expected to
reduce the deficit bv 2A%
GDP in 199516. This represents a substantial medium-term adjustment in line with the
Community's broad economic policy guidelines. While most of this adjustment will
consist of increases in tax revenues, there are also substantial cuts in planned
expenditure implying a reversal of the upward trend in public expenditures in recent
years and a very tight control which may be difficult to sustain.
Although risks remnin for the future
The size of fiscal adjustment due in 199415 and subsequent years does raise the issue
of the appropriate stance of policy and the impact on the economy. While the pre-
announcement of tax increases and other changes was designed to avoid dampening
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down the rather slow recovery in 1993, the question of the impact in 1994 remains.
Tax increases taking place from April 1994 amount to UKL 8 4 billion (l.Z% GDp)
and it is not clear how much of a risk there is to the upswing. Hence careful judgement
is required concerning the appropriate stance of policy overall in the face of the fiscal
tightening.
Monetary policy has been set in the context of maintaining inflation on a downward
course. To this end the authorities have adopted a direct inflation target with regular
monitoring by the monetary authorities. The direct targeting of inflation implies
careful policy judgement about the future course of inflation and during 1993, even in
the face of a somewhat unexpectedly good inflation performance, the UK authorities
took a cautious approach to monetary policy. No doubt the authorities were influenced
by a recognition of the lagged impact of the sharp falls in interest rates which occured
since the UK left the ERM in Septemb er 1992. Indicators of longer-term inflation
expectations and inflation performances suggest that the credibility of the monemry
policy framework grew steadily during the course of 1993.
While the cunent inflation performance in the UK is among the best in the
Community, at least in headline terms, nevertheless there is a need to take account of
the risks which could be realized through the course of the upturn. One uncertainty in
UK policy concerns the extent of the gap between potential and actual output, i.e. in
judging the risks which the developing upturn could lead to in terms of inflationary
pressure. There might also be some concern about possible restoration of margins;
with producer output prices having risen more strongly than retail prices and evidence
of severe price competition at the retail level. However the squeeze on profit margins
will have been moderated (or even offset) by the good productivity performance.
Nevertheless the indications of a rise in employment and the normal cyclical effects on
productivity could lead to a greater pass through of cost and price pressures as ther
upswing develops. There is also some uncertainty about wage behaviour, although on
the basis of previous cyclical behaviour, wage pressures are unlikely to be a factor irr
the course of 1994. All of these factors, in the context of a monetary policy which
targets the inflation variable directly would argue in favour of a degree of caution i1
monetary policy decisions.
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